

EXPLORING HIZBUT TAHRIR INDONESIA AS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT: A CASE AT PAREPARE INDONESIA

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Abstract:

This study will look into the social movement of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) in Parepare City, Indonesia to see if it can be considered a social movement. This kind of research uses qualitative descriptive research, which incorporates a normative theological approach; a sociological approach; and a juridical approach. They used a survey method in their research. The different data collection methods were done through interviews, observation, and documentation. The data used is qualitative data, field research, or HTI member information from the City of Parepare to determine HTI member demographics. The data in this field is being used to research HTI social movements in the Parepare community. This demonstrated that in the social activities undertaken by HTI, namely using da'wah as a means of establishing a caliphate, their efforts have proven successful. HTI does not act explicitly on behalf of a social movement because since its founding, it has openly declared itself to be a political activity. It is required in order to carry out political struggles that a prosperous society be established on the basis of an economic and social system.

Keywords: HTI, social movement, Parepare

INTRODUCTION

In the Indonesian context, HT is referred to as HTI, which means Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). HT is, as mentioned, a political party that adheres to an Islamic ideology. Politics, therefore, is its main activity, and Islam is its ideology. "Save Indonesia with Islamic Sharia," "Unify Muslim Ummahs in the Khilafah System," and "Refuse American Intervention" are some of the slogans screamed by HT, which have a fundamentalist odor and tone (Hamid, 2007; Muliono, et al., 2019). HT stands for 'independence party,' yet it has never run for office in Indonesia since its arrival. The number of supporters and sympathizers is quite high, which will, of course, be used by other political parties in the country to gain seats in parliament (Karagiannis, 2006; Qodir, 2008).

Prior to the downfall of the New Order, it was well-known that HT had already been discovered in Indonesia. HTI began development in Indonesia in 1982, when Abdurrahman al-Baghdadi and Musthofa co-founded the organization. Al-Baghdadi is a Lebanese immigrant who comes from a family of HT activists from the very beginning. In 1981, Abdullah bin Nuh (the founder of the Al-Ghazali Islamic Boarding School) came to Indonesia and settled there by helping the al-Ghazali Islamic Boarding School, which he had founded (Bakri, 2021). While he was in Jordan, he got to know HT by virtue of his parents' insistence on

modernity and having a strong relationship with DDI, which he then continued on while attending HT (Darajat, 2017; Rubaidi, 2008).

The Hizbut Tahrir (HT) mass organization movement has gained a large amount of attention as it has grown from a single province in Indonesia, South Sulawesi, to an archipelago-wide movement, including in Parepare, a small city in Indonesia's Sulawesi Province. As one can see, this city has a vast range of perspectives; some from the viewpoint of religion, others of community culture, and other perspectives from other parts of the city. This city, as well as the others in the Bay of Bandar Madani, is all places that can embrace many changes since all of these cities are ports and are thus named the City of Bandar Madani (Rofiq & Ridwan, 2019:1-14).

To put it bluntly, students of religion find this to be a metropolis of their kind in this city, as they have two Islamic boarding schools here: AGH Abdurrahman Ambo Dalle's Pondok Pesantren DDI Lil Banat and an Islamic secondary school of similar name established by AGH Sayid Abdurrahman. An inordinate number of scholars were birthed from this city, directly under the tuition and guidance of Gurutta Ambo Dalle. Although Islamic boarding schools are not the only religious-based universities found in this city, there are several of them. One of these is the Parepare State Islamic College (STAIN), Parepare Muhammadiyah University (UMPAR), and the DDI Islamic Religious College (Prasetiawati, E., 2017:523-570; Said, 2015).

Because of the presence of religious education institutions, both Islamic boarding schools and religion-based tertiary institutions, the people of Parepare City have evolved into a religious society based on religious values. This, therefore, means that religious-based community organizations and social movements can thrive in this city. Some of the religious-based organizations in Parepare City are NU, Muhammadiyah, BKPRMI, LDII, and others (Suharto, 2014; Muqoyyidin, 2013).

HTI is the latest and largest religious movement that colourfully completes the Parepare community's religious life. This social movement is made up of a variety of individuals, including students, teachers, scholars, lecturers, businessmen, and members of the general public. Because of HTI's activities in the City of Parepare, various social movements also operating in the city have been labeled as a means to fight back against globalization, and one of these movements is the Islamic Civilization movement with the goal of dealing with a topical issue that is receiving increasing attention, from both regional, national, and international levels. However, given the widespread interest in studying the activities and movements of social movements in Parepare, the activities and movements of HTI activists merit closer scrutiny (Faiqah & Pransiska, 2018).

This study was carried out in the Indonesian city of Parepare, in the province of South Sulawesi. Parepare is a city with a majority Muslim population, and its people are diverse and accepting of others. Parepare has a great deal of potential for conflict aside from being a city of education, a city of services, a religious city, and a commercial center. Assuming that

social-organizational growth and development can be performed well by a community organization in Parepare, as seen in this picture.

Many researchers have previously examined HTI and social movements, and similar studies can be found in several of these publications. Osman (2010) studied the transnational HTI network. This research aims to explore the regional network of the Indonesian chapter of HT, a transnational Islamic group who seek to revive the Islamic Caliphate. The research paper focuses on the section of HT in Indonesia, which includes various activities which other chapters of HTI perform across the country and throughout the region. To clarify, the writer's goal is to demonstrate how the HTI and its chapters all over the world are interconnected and how the transnational activism of the HTI will influence its members. Muhtadi (2009) conducted an in-depth research on the pursuit of HT in Indonesia this article describes the nature of HTI in the post-Suharto era and how it believes in the resurrection of the global Islamic caliphate, as well as its opposition to concepts of democracy and the notion of the nation-state. Hilmy (2014) investigated the origins of transnationalism in HTI from an Islamic perspective.

This paper examines the root causes of "Islamic transnationalism" or "transnational Islam" in Indonesia by using three theoretical frameworks: Islamic transnationalism (ITM), Islamic internationalism (II), and Islamic internationalization (II) one example of (1) travelling theory; two examples of (2) hibridity theory, and three examples of (3) diaspora theory. This paper focuses on an Islamic movement called HTI ("Islamic Transnationalism"), who is an adherent of the ideology of "Islamic transnationalism" ("Khilafah Islamiyah"). Before proceeding with HTI's ideological background, it is first necessary to define the term "transnational Islam." Who are nonviolent extremists?" crescendo The Muslim Brotherhood is ideologically similar to other radical Muslim movements, such as Al-Qaeda, and it is openly hostile to the West, capitalism, democracy, liberalism, and pluralism. The main goal of building an Islamic state in Indonesia is to join it to a global caliphate or Muslim superstate. In contrast to other radical groups, HTI avoids any use of violence. This research was conducted to discover the existence of the HTI social movement in Parepare City, which is a social movement. The main aim of this research is to explore the perceptions and attitudes of Parepare City residents regarding the presence of the HTI social movement.

METHODS

This is a qualitative descriptive research (Yin, 2016), with a normative theological approach, a sociological approach, and a legal approach (Mulyana, 2008: 159). The research employed a method of survey (Conti & Pudney, 2011). Interviews, observation and documentation have been used to collect data (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Qualitative data, namely field research done by HTI members in the City of Parepare, was used to obtain quantitative data (Burgess, 2003). This field data is used to determine the HTI social movements in the community of Parepare.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Based on observer results, His but Tahrir has conducted a number of studies, reviews, and studies on ummah conditions and the decline they are suffering in social movements. HT also carried out a series of studies, but Da'wah Islamiyah, a local Islamic movement, imitated the Prophet when spreading Islam. Relative to this example, HT intends to use the da'wah movement to help people learn about Islam. HTI puts a large emphasis on social action (Dawah) because that is the most effective way to achieve their goals of bringing unity to their faith and rising awareness for their cause. They do this through speeches, panel discussions, and training various sectors of society to educate others on their cause.

The training provided by HT worldwide is universal, starting with intense training for potential cadres, which is known as general training, and the following level of training from students is also called intensive training (employees). Muslim coaches received a dialogue that included aspects of Islam as a whole, not just Islam that has been widely adopted by other organizations, i.e. individual adherents of Islam, but also the application of Islam in the public sector. At HTI, we practice a diverse range of ways to interact with the community, from personal approaches such as scholars, businessmen, students, teachers, lecturers, and others to collaborative activities. Seminars, conferences, and assemblies can also be used for another form of general interaction: to hold them in mosques and on college campuses (Syakir, 2014).

Incorporating all of the recommended coaching strategies used by HT members is essential, and the same approaches are used wherever HT members are present and progressing. Materials are provided on the basis of the level of Halaqah and the membership level that are being followed. This theory, first advanced in the fields of politics and economics, holds that "as is the case in politics and economics, it will be found that in the social sector, HT is linked to the concept of the caliphate state model they are trying to achieve." The notion that social problems in the Muslim community and in the Indonesian population can be handled by the state if the issues are not left in the hands of large scale organizations is laid out by Alicia Clark, who is based on these people. The country of your choice may be found by looking for a caliphate state.

His influence in the social sector: through understanding the relationship between Islam and the way men and women conduct their lives based on the Koran and the Sunnah, provides an understanding that Islam governs the daily activities of people in accordance with the law of the Koran and the tradition of the Prophet, and is significantly different from the secular society in this country, especially the people of Parepare. The existing rules are different from God's rules, because secularists spread destructive ideas about freedom (Zulfikar, 2014). The above statement is usually discussed in the material Halakah which talks about the personality of Islam. HTI members have a comprehensive confirmation that Islam regulates every human life, including the relationship between men and women.

It is worth understanding that HT does not move within social movement but, at times, in HT, political is the form of a movement that is carried out, as this is the basis or source of all the

current problems, which means that the policies of taking care of all people's affairs should follow Islam as exemplified by the Prophet Muhammad and the Khula (Syakir, 2014). This appears to be a statement in which the writer is trying to stress that HTI is not a mass organization, but rather a movement in which the organization calls a political movement. HTI believes that today's politics is the source of the problems, and as a result, Islamic practices are being violated. Politics as practiced in this country falls short of Prophet Muhammad's model, khulafaurrasyyidin and his accomplices.

The concern for people is how Taqiyuddin an-thought Nabhani's that has founding fathers which states that 'Whoever does not accept the role of a caliph until the end of his life, then that person is already a dead man walking in an idolatrous state of ignorance' might turn out. Wahid also stated that: To be sure, this means that every person who has passed away throughout the thousand-year caliphate era until today, who was born and raised in the time between the rise of the caliphate and its eventual fall, have all ended their lives as disbelievers because at that time, Muslims had no longer learned about the Khilafah. Then today, with the passing of the Khilafah era, does everyone sin, because they no longer have a caliph in a country that is in the form of a caliphate. This is an example of the requirement to select leaders in the context of the obligation to establish an Islamic state, rather than of the goal of creating an Islamic state. Because only the ignorance (jahiliyyah) will not attempt to put a social order into place without a leader, without a government

The phenomenon of the movement in the name of Islam has been more colorful than the pure Islamic movement. The call to uphold an Islamic state (read the Khilafah) throughout the world, has always been associated with accusations of secularism and kufr so that in the end they demanded that they issue a fatwa of 'killing those who are infidels', so that acts of terror have sprung up to suppress those who have disbelieved because of their disbelief. It is not only secularists as the only target of their operations, but also includes other state components such as civil society, the constitution, democracy, political parties, parliaments, and so on. This is commonplace because their ultimate goal is to uphold the caliphate, with a structure of thought that is similar to autocratic rule, so that every step towards democracy is an enemy that must be crushed.

Islamic Sharia according to HTI is the solution to all crises experienced by this nation. Islamic Shari'ah needs to improve the morale of society which is corrupted because Allah is increasingly being kept away from their lives. In the field of law, the deterrent effect of Islamic law is considered to be stronger than the prevailing system. This deterrent effect is indispensable if the Indonesian nation is eager to overcome acute problems that have been unsolvable for so long, namely collusion, corruption, and nepotism. In the economic field, the Islamic economy is considered to be far more promising in creating the welfare of the people than the secular economy which cannot be separated from usury. Social justice will be achieved if we apply Islamic law because this system is more pro-society than just defending the interests of an elite minority group such as in the capitalist system. If the capitalist system gives birth to social inequality, the Islamic economic system will give birth to social justice.

HT argues that the Islamic concept of Kaffah should form an Islamic government or caliphate. While the majority of Muslims are of the view that the ummah should obey the legitimate and sovereign government, while the form and system of government is quite following the form and system in their respective countries. These two different views have implications for two different perspectives: (1) how to position and view Islamic shari'ah; (2) how Islamic shari'ah operates in society, especially plural societies in Indonesia.

Democracy as the best choice for the Indonesian nation is considered to have failed to answer the nation's contemporary problems and failed to bring about change. When the democratic system has failed, then the Islamic syari'at system is the alternative. Democracy must be replaced by a system based on Islamic law which has permanent legal certainty because it was created by Allah. HT declared its organization as a political and anti-democratic party, or in its religious language, it forbids democracy and fights for an Islamic caliphate. Through two strategies, namely ideological dissemination and regeneration, fundamentalists (including HTI) enter educational institutions at all levels. The first strategy, organizing religious programs such as Islamic training in educational institutions, namely Islamic Training for Beginners, tutoring for students, services for harakah or movement books. The second strategy, regeneration. This movement carries out exercises that will be fostered to become movement cadres.

There is a process of guidance through halaqoh or tarbiyah in Hizb which aims as one of the goals of halaqoh which is the process of internalizing thoughts, the concepts being fought for, in addition to general concepts about Islam. Apart from matters of faith and worship, other studies are political ideas that will be fought for and the transformation of ideas of the people Hizb.

One of the influences of Taqiyuddin an-Nabhani's thinking is the direct discussion of his books. HTI is a political party while Taqiyuddin an-Nabhani is the founder of HT. He carried out a lot of ijtihad including the concept championed in HT. HTI also applies the concept Tabanni. Tabanni is a concept of adoption that originally came from individuals, from mujtahids, or among scholars and jurists, and so on. After being analyzed and reviewed then it is adopted to be part of HT's thinking. Furthermore, there was a transformation from individual thought (Taqiyuddin a Nabhani) to an organizational thought adopted by HTI, a Da'wah Party. The vision and mission were fought for even though the basic ideas of HTI were heavily influenced by Taqiyuddin an-Nabhani. The public does not know for sure that Taqiyuddin an-Nabhani's thoughts influenced the HT movement in the City of Parepare.

HTI still introduces itself as a political party, when I searched for data on Kesbang, I did not find HTI as a registered member of mass organizations and social movements, which became interesting later for me, because HTI had entered Parepare around 2000-2001. At first, the government did not pay attention to HTI entering Parepare. They bring their understanding of the caliphate, even though it is their understanding that must be corrected, because the understanding they carry is wrong, which seems to want to impose, now there is no coercion that HTI has done, but one day if it is firmly entrenched, resistance will emerge. Does not rule out the way of moving will be like ISIS (Rustan, 2014).

The reaction to the ISIS movement that has emerged recently has not only attracted the attention of the world in general, but even a social movement that has ideas and ideas about a concept of an Islamic state or caliphate has also reacted to the emergence of ISIS. Call it HTI, through Amir it issued an official fatwa rejecting ideas and ideas about the establishment of a caliphate state as proclaimed by ISIS (fatwa excerpts can be seen in the attachment of the author's dissertation) on the pretext that the concept of caliphate championed by ISIS is not the same as the concept of caliphate championed by HTI, namely the concept of khulafaurrasyidin which uses the manhaj of the Prophet.

The author's observation assesses that the government is not only wary of the ISIS movement which has begun to penetrate Islamic countries, it must also be aware of similar movements that have emerged and have developed in Indonesia, namely HTI. The HTI movement existed and developed in Indonesia and the city of Parepare long before ISIS was discussed by the world as it is today. HTI as a social movement emerged and brought with it the idea of a caliphate state that resembled the idea under ISIS, even though the two movements were different in their way of spreading. The same thing was expressed by the author's informant who is a member of the harmony between religious communities in the City of Parepare.

The response shown by Amir HTI is certainly very 'strange' and raises the question, aren't both (ISIS and HTI) fighting for an Islamic state. Of course, the emergence of ISIS which uses the same style as HTI is a threat in itself for HTI, considering that the movement taqiyah that HTI has been running so far will be uncovered. If the public is observant in assessing it, it will be found that HTI also carries the same threat to the Republic of Indonesia, considering that these two movements both want to change the basis of the country wherever they live and develop, including Indonesia. The underground movement carried out by HTI will at any time be uncovered and inevitably the governments and public attention will be focused on HTI. Meanwhile, HTI has been sticking its nails for a long time to form a structured cell for the creation of the caliphate state that they have been dreaming of for years.

The author assesses that HTI is experiencing shocks and worries if HTI's disguises so far will be exposed. HTI is also a movement that the central and regional governments must be aware of considering that HTI also wants to replace Pancasila with a caliphate system, if the National Police and the Constitutional Court have stated a firm stance on the rejection of mass organizations or social movements that want to replace Pancasila, they should be more assertive to trace these movements. the Islamic movement threatened the unitary state of Indonesia and attempted to replace Pancasila. The presence of HTI by using the model of taqiyah dissolution life and with the community is a separate threat which in the future might explode like a "time bomb" which at any time could explode into a revolutionary movement to replace Pancasila and threaten the Republic of Indonesia when the government realized it was too late to anticipate it.

Particularly in the City of Parepare, the Mayor of Parepare explicitly stated that it was not justified for a single person living in the City of Parepare to violate the constitution, and would expel the people if anyone came out of the constitution (Pawe, 2014). Ironically HTI

as a social movement continues to survive and grow in Indonesia, including in Parepare. But because the HTI movement is silent, it causes HTI to remain safe and freely spread its teachings. Even though the idea developed by HTI is an idea that wants to establish an Islamic state in the form of a caliphate and replace Pancasila, even though these two movements both threaten the Republic of Indonesia but the attitudes and treatment of the government towards them are not the same. The government should expressly issue the same prohibition and treatment against social movements that are indicated to have aspirations that want to replace Pancasila or threaten the Republic of Indonesia.

The author assesses that the Parepare government has been negligent in dealing with HTI that was developing in Parepare before this movement took root and formed a wider network. Although the HTI movement in Parepare is powerless because of the strong influence of cultural Islam in the City of Parepare. The presence of large organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah as well as DDI on the other hand also hampers the growth rate of HTI in the City of Parepare. From several events that the author has attended, whether when HTI conducts free dialogue, seminars, or commemorates the national day which they celebrate in their version, the author sees that the number of attendees is insignificant with the length of time HTI has lived in Parepare. This indicates that HTI in Parepare is "weak" or powerless with the strong influence of this big organization. The teachings and understanding spread by HTI during the Parepare community culture which is already established with NU and Muhammadiyah understanding, have no "interest" and are "hindered" when conducting dialogue with several NU and Muhammadiyah figures in the city of Parepare.

For NU, the idea of an Islamic state is a misinterpretation of the understanding of the Islamic term kaffah (comprehensive) which is then translated into the obligation to establish an Islamic government. Shari'ah or Islamic law must be practiced, but it does not need to go through Islamic power or government. Muslims in a country is obliged to carry out every Islamic teaching. However, this obligation does not apply to efforts to establish an Islamic government. "To take Islam seriously does not have to be with the Islamic caliphate. Recognizing and obeying the legal and sovereign government is mandatory (Wahid, 2009: 195). Said KH. Hasyim Muzadi, and explained that the two biggest moderate Islamic forces in Indonesia, NU and Muhammadiyah, have never wanted this country to be built based on a particular religion, including Islam.

Islamic groups with transnational ideologies in their own home countries often create conflicts. So that if the Indonesian people follow it, it will become part of their problem, besides that they are not following the local culture (Wahid, 2009: 197). NU's religious tradition is a religious charity practiced by the majority of Indonesian Muslims so that in a nutshell it can be summarized. it is said that the citizens of NU and the Indonesian nation are one inseparable unit. NU realizes that every danger threatens the preservation of Pancasila and the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia, as indigenous Islam or private Islam that has been integrated with the pulse of a peaceful Indonesian culture.

To recognize the presence of HTI in an event is very easy, considering the appearance and characteristics of HTI clothing are easy to read. Especially in the City of Parepare, they still

maintain their clothing characteristics so that they can easily recognize the presence of HTI members, even though they try to adapt the clothes they wear, their movements and ways of dressing are very easy to detect. From the author's research on HTI, in several major events that I attended, I concluded that HTI did not experience encouraging development in the City of Parepare. Some HTI activists had to go home 'empty-handed' when these activists came and had a dialogue with activists from NU and Muhammadiyah organizations because their ideas were refuted. This indicates that HTI in Parepare is powerless.

From some of the critical analyzes above, the writer states that HTI in Parepare City is a social movement and no longer a political party like when HT was formed or as the name of this movement is called Hizb which means party, this is because HTI in Parepare City has one of the criteria as a social movement that can be identified with the criteria of the Reactionary Movement, a social movement that aims to replace the institutions and values of the present with those of the past. An example is the Ku Klux Klan movement in the United States. This secret organization seeks to return to the past in the United States when social institutions supported the superiority of whites over blacks (White Supremacy) (Sunarto 1993:5). HTI is also not a Civil Society Organization (OMS) because HTI does not have criteria that can be called CSOs. These criteria are: CSOs have strong potential to develop democracy.

CSOs can actualize this potential when they meet the following criteria: First, it is characterized by open recruitment of members, the existence of the principle of equality in the organization. Second, CSOs have a high level of institutionalization that has autonomy, adaptability, coherence, and complexity. Third, in itself, CSOs have civicness which includes tolerance, trust, cooperation, and so on. Fourth, CSOs always respect and develop pluralism. Fifth, CSOs are characterized by 'density' or broad popular support (Sunarto 1993: 47). Such CSOs are commonly referred to as vibrant and courageous CSOs (vibrant civil society organizations) that have a positive contribution to organizational development. HTI does not have these five criteria. Likewise, HTI cannot be called a political party because HTI is a political party that is very contrary to Law No. 2 of 2008 which regulates the formation of political parties, the objectives, functions, rights, and obligations of political parties among the objectives of establishing political parties which read: a). realizing the national ideals of the Indonesian nation as referred to in the preamble to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, b). Maintain and maintain the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia, c). developing a democratic life based on Pancasila by upholding the sovereignty of the people within the Republic of Indonesia (Cangara, 2009: 213).

CONCLUSION

Based on the research results, HT is a political party, although, in reality, the movement is a social movement. The founder of HTI (Taqiyuddin an-Nabhani) and the current generation of HT still admit that HT is a political party. As a da'wah movement, HTI strives for the establishment of Islamic law. A political party has political ideals that are championed conceptually. To carry out the political struggle, a political institution in the form of a

political, economic, and social system is needed to create a prosperous society. HT already has these political instruments which are fought for and preached. The opinion of Imam Shafi'i ibn Taimiyyah or scholars who are compatible and relevant was adopted and brought into the concept of fikroh HT. This has entered and can no longer be said to be identical, but Taqiuddin's thoughts still influence HT as the formulator of the initial frame of mind for this movement. In the field of social activities carried out by HTI, namely utilizing da'wah. Because according to Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, preaching is the only way to achieve success in establishing the caliphate. Although in essence HTI does not explicitly mention HT as a social movement, because since its establishment, HT has indeed proclaimed itself as a political activity, practically everything is always associated with political thought, whether it is talking about economic issues or talking about social activities.

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