

ISIS COMMUNICATION NETWORK IN INDONESIA: A STUDY OF THREE REGIONS

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Abstract

ISIS entered Indonesia by spreading narratives and calls for jihad to establish a caliphate in the form of an Islamic state. This call succeeded in awakening many terror organizations, including sympathizers of terrorism in the 'lone wolf' category. In a very short time, ISIS has transformed into a very threatening terror group in Indonesia. This group grew through the Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) group led by Aman Abdurrahman in three main areas: Poso, Jakarta, and Surabaya. In these regions, ISIS moves through a communication network in which Aman acts as an intermediary actor. This article analyses the ISIS as a whole network by focusing on the grouping, dominant actors within the group, and network structure using analysis of communication network studies combined with the application of quantitative calculations of Ucinet tools.

Keywords: ISIS, Communication Network, Dominant Actor, Network Structure

Introduction

The ISIS group was once detected in Indonesia after the appearance of a video containing propaganda and an invitation to 'hijrah' from Abu Muhammad Al-Indonesi and several other Indonesian citizens who were already at ISIS headquarters. The hijrah in this case is a long journey; leaving Indonesia, which is believed to be a thagut country, to the Islamic State promised by ISIS. The video, which immediately went viral on social media pages, shocked many people, including those who crave the caliphate.

Abu Muhammad al Indonesi himself is a pseudonym for Bahrumsyah, a member of the extremist group Al Muhajirun. The group was founded by Omar Bakri Muhammad, an extremist preacher and former leader of Hizb ut-Tahrir who was born in Syria but has been expelled from his home country since 1977 for his views against the Baath party. He founded Al Muhajirun in 1983 while living in Saudi Arabia, but again, he was expelled from Saudi Arabia because his religious views were considered too extreme. He then moved to England and was granted asylum there. In England, he immediately founded Hizb ut-Tahrir and recruited young people (Watson, BBC 28 June 2017).

The Institute for Policy and Analysis of Conflict (IPAC, 2014) report states that Al Muhajirun became an engine for pro-ISIS networks in Indonesia. They build relationships with other terrorist groups still operating in Indonesia, some of which are the Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) and the Mujahidin Indonesia Barat (MIB).

At almost the same time, Aman Abdurrahman who was languishing in the Kembang Kuning Penitentiary (LP) in Nusa Kambangan summoned several of his followers to give instructions to support the ISIS group which was led by Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. Aman Abdurrahman is no stranger to the networks and movements of terrorism groups in Indonesia. He is the founder of Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), an offshoot of the Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) group led by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. Before languishing in Nusa Kambangan, he was thrown into prison until 2008 for the case of a bomb detonation at his rented house. Two years later, he was again locked up after being caught taking part in military training in Jantho, Aceh. While in prison, Aman translated many written works, both books and short articles, by Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi's extreme leanings.

Aman Abdurrahman's translations are widely circulated among militant groups, moreover, the translator of these works is one of the leaders of terrorist groups in Indonesia; the work immediately influenced many people to believe more in extreme religious directions and be crazy about ideas. Caliphate. A safe follower of the Indonesian ISIS network, Ustaz Muslih, said that the caliphate theme was of great interest to the brothers and their sympathizers because these people crave a quiet and noble life; and it can only be obtained under the caliphate system. Other themes that are also of great interest are hijrah, jihad, haram democracy, and non-Muslim leaders (Muslih, 2021).

Aman not only plays a role by lecturing in prisons and translating books, he is also a mentor for the Court of Shari'a Indonesia Group, a grassroots level group which is an adoption of the Shari'a UK group created by Anjem Choudary which focuses on spreading the concept of caliphate in England. In Indonesia, this group networked to find and strengthen the bonds of ISIS supporters in Indonesia.

The group assisted by Aman Abdurrahman also created a website www.al-mustaqbal.net to spread their views and propaganda more broadly. They then formed the Islamic Sharia Activist Forum (FAKSI). This group was the first to express support for the establishment of ISIS. Their support was only one month after Omar Bakri's declaration that he also supported ISIS in October 2013. The faction moved quickly, on February 8, 2014, they held a big event and expressed their support for ISIS at the Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University in Jakarta.

Support for ISIS continued to a declaration led by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir from Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT) in Surakarta, Central Java on June 14, 2014. The day after that, on July 15, 2014, support for ISIS also emerged in Sukoharjo. The declaration of support, led by Amir Machmud, was carried out at the Baitul Makmur Mosque in Grogol. From East Java, support for ISIS also emerged, namely from the Lowokwaru area of Malang by the Ansharu Khilafah group on July 20 2014. After that, there were many invitations to support ISIS, mainly through the internet (Haryanto, 2015: 23-40).

A number of people think that the massive support for ISIS in Indonesia cannot be separated from the role played by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. His considerable influence among radical groups makes it easy for him to give directions or even orders, including ordering to support ISIS.

Meanwhile, Aman Abdurrahman – who has supported ISIS for a long time – deliberately used the figure of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir to attract more members. At that time, Aman and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir were both languishing in the Nusa Kambangan prison, thus the two often met and discussed.

Both of them, along with their respective followers, reportedly made a declaration of support for ISIS on 29 June 2014, followed by news that Abu Bakr Ba'asyir and ISIS supporters made a similar declaration in a letter sent to Al-mustaqbal.net on 2 July 2014. However, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir denied the news. He admits he supports the caliphate, but he has never taken an oath of allegiance to ISIS. He only asked his followers to support ISIS, yet he himself did not take the oath (BBC, 15 July 2014). Ba'asyir's attitude seems to have angered a number of parties, especially the senior officials and JAT, they said that Abu Bakar Ba'asyir was not serious and even violated religious orders because he refused to take allegiance to the caliph. He was forced to finally admit to supporting ISIS. Photos of his abdication were widely circulated in the media in early August 2014 (Tempo, 2 August 2014).

Since then, the influence of ISIS ideology began to enter and inspire the rise of radical groups in Indonesia. Some of these resurgent groups have even become ISIS wing organizations in Indonesia, they carry out many acts of terror in order to participate in realizing the main ideals of ISIS, namely making riots under the pretext of carrying out religious orders, especially related to the establishment of the caliphate as the sole leader of all Muslims in the world.

Theoretical Framework

All findings related to the activities of ISIS network groups in Indonesia will be analysed with a comprehensive analysis of the communication network (whole network) of all actors involved in the ISIS network in Indonesia. This analysis will focus on several levels of measurement, ranging from actors, groups, to network structure systems (Borgatti et al, 2013: 151-220). This analysis will also measure several key characteristics such as centralization and network cohesiveness, especially when the analysis reaches the system level or network structure.

Centralization needs to be measured to see whether information about ISIS teachings is centred on certain key actors or is spread evenly to all members of the network. Related to this, Bavelas in "The Gatekeeper, Pair-Dependency and Structural Centrality." (Linton C, 1980: 585-592), mentions that the pattern of information distribution in the network is generally divided into two; if there is centralization of information, the form of centralization resembles a star where the main actor is in the middle. If there is no centralization – decentralization – (which is indicated by a score of 0), the shape resembles a circle in which all actors in the network are connected to each other without barriers.

While for the network cohesiveness, the analysis is focused on comparing the degree of measurement which includes: (1) the density of the network, namely the comparison of the number of ties in the actual (existing) bond and the potential for additional ties from other actors outside the network. Namely people who may be interested or have the potential to join

the ISIS network in Indonesia. The higher the density value in the network, the higher the level of cohesiveness in it. (2) The average level of relations (average degree), namely the comparison of the total number of relationships that have been formed with the number of all actors (nodes) in the network. The average value that emerges from this measurement is directly proportional to the level of network cohesiveness. (3) The level of connection (closure) and fragmentation of each actor in the network. This measurement rests on the assumption that a cohesive network tends to have a high connectedness value and a low fragmentation value.

The fourth (4) is the diameter of the tissue. Namely the measurement of the distance or steps (path) between two actors who are connected to each other in the network. The lower the diameter value, the more cohesive the relationship between actors. According to Eriyanto (2014), diameter is a measure that shows the furthest distance between two actors so that they can interact. If there is an actor in the network that has a diameter value of 3, it means that the farthest distance for an actor to interact with other actors is 3 steps or a path. Small networks are generally characterized by small diameter values, which means actors only need small steps to connect with other actors in the network.

Distance is the average steps required by all actors to be able to interact with each other. While the step (path) is not only about how many steps it takes to connect with other actors, but also what paths the actor can take to connect with other actors. (Eriyanto, 2014: 334—339). At the group level, the whole network analysis looks at the level of cohesiveness of the actors who are connected because they have the same interest, namely carrying out ISIS teachings. Although the object seen is the level of cohesiveness, this study will only focus on intermediary actors which will then be analyzed with the ego network. Ego network analysis is used to identify two central roles of intermediary towards alter actors it has.

Findings and Discussion

The following is data from the results of research on 13 Police Investigation Report and national media coverage of suspected ISIS terrorist networks in Indonesia as well as an analysis of the ISIS network that spreads and grows in three regions: East Indonesia Mujahidin (MIT) group in Poso, the Jakarta Group, and the Surabaya Group.

ISIS at MIT

The East Indonesia Mujahidin Group (MIT) formed by Santoso et al. in late 2012 when they began declaring themselves as part of ISIS after taking allegiance in July 2014. MIT published a video of their declaration and calling themselves “Soldiers of the Islamic State”. The video also contains threats against the government and police officers of the Republic of Indonesia. On April 3, 2015 a gun battle took place between MIT and the Special Detachment (Densus) 88 troops. Daeng Koro, Santoso's right-hand man, was killed in the incident. Meanwhile, Santoso and his followers managed to escape.

The link between MIT in Poso and ISIS in Syria was Bahrin Naim, the leader of the Ansharut Daulah Khilafah Nusantara Network (JADKN) and a student of Aman Abdurrahman, the main

figure of ISIS in Indonesia. Bahrn Naim's involvement in the ISIS-MIT network is confirmed by many parties. Some of them are the Community of Ideological Islamic Analyst (CIIA) which mentions Bahrn Naim as a liaison between these two terrorist groups. The Indonesian National Police, through Commissioner General Badrodin Haiti who was then Deputy Chief of the Indonesian National Police, in a press conference at the Central Sulawesi Police Headquarters, Palu on April 4, 2015 also confirmed that Santoso and MIT have close ties to ISIS.

The MIT group was born from the embryo of the Lintas Tanzim Aceh group which was dissolved by the state. The ideology and movement of the group were then brought to Poso by Abu Tholut who then founded JAT Poso by recruiting Ustaz Yasin and Santoso. This group failed to thrive in Poso. Even Santoso, who was the military trainer for the Poso JAT group, defected and founded MIT with Daeng Koro, Basri alias Bagong, Ali Kalora, etc. In this new group, Santoso appointed himself as chairman. Under Santoso's leadership, MIT made allegiance to ISIS. Aman Abdurrahman and Bahrn Naim are said to be behind the entry and spread of ISIS ideology in the MIT group.

This finding shows that the number of communication lines in the network is not always aligned with the social capital owned by the actor. Ali Kalora with ten communication lines is certainly less powerful than Abu Tholut, even though the number of communication lines for the two is very much different; two to ten. This fact breaks the basic argument of the Structural Gap theory which states that the more relationships that are built, the higher the capital owned by the ego actor (Eriyanto, 2014: 215-216). The findings of the MIT group show that the level of capital in the network is not determined by the number of relationships that are built, but the quality of the relationships. It could be that this finding only applies to terrorist groups that by nature move by relying on underground patterns and methods.

While at the network density level, the number of nodes in the MIT network is 22 while the number of ties (ties) is 25. This very slight difference in numbers (only 3 points) indicates that there are many structural holes, which means there are many members. MIT relies on certain actors to build ties with other members. The density level shown is also very small, namely 0.054. The highest score for the density level is 1, which means the number of links equals the number of possible links that appear. Therefore, this low score indicates that the communication bonds within the MIT network are not dense. Again, this is most likely due to the underground/

A fairly sparse score is also shown in the diameter section, the MIT group has a score of 4. The diameter referred to here is the distance between two actors to interact. If the distance (diameter) is given a score of 4, it means that on average each actor in the network has to go through 4 steps to interact with other actors. The more barriers that must be traversed to interact, the higher the level of rigidity of a group's hierarchy. The MIT group, therefore, is a closed group with a very rigid hierarchical model of enactment. The pattern of communication that occurs in this group is more often in the form of one-way communication; lectures, directions, orders, etc.

In fact, small and open networks generally only require small steps to build interaction with other actors because the number of actors in a small network is also small, but the MIT group is unique; they are small but have a lot of clearance. Obstacles in this group can be read as actors. The number of active and counted actors in the system is 22. They are the key actors who become the engine for the MIT group. The number of network members is actually small, but the distance between them is large (4); each actor on average must go through (or be mediated) by 4 other actors before being able to interact with the intended actor.

As for the influence and role of actors in the network, it appears that the actor with the most active contact with other actors, is Ali Kalora. He has an outdeg of 10 that means, Ali has contacted 10 actors. However, his index is low, which is 2, which means that although Ali can freely establish relationships with 10 other actors, there are only two actors who can contact him. Chances are, Ali is deliberately limiting the question of who can and cannot contact him. Ali wants to stay at the top of the organization and apply a top-bottom, he will only give orders, and so he opens lines to contact other actors but closes lines for other actors to contact.

This is certainly understandable because Ali Kalora was prepared to become a leadership successor at MIT. Ali has also been "trained" in combat by bringing his own troops, one of which was the murder of a family in St.2 Lewono Hamlet, Lemban Tongoa Village, Palolo District, Sigi Regency, on Friday (11/27/2020). Ali is known to have been involved in a brutal attack that killed four people, consisting of a husband and wife, their child and son-in-law, based on witness testimony to the police. Some terrorism observers say that Ali Kalora is not really ready to become a leader, he did not have the ability as good as Santoso in recruiting people, his influence in groups was also weak, yet MIT seemed to have no other choice. Ali Kalora was 'forced' to become the leader because his previous leader, Basri, was arrested by the security forces in 2016. That same year, Santoso was killed in a military-police ambush.

Even so, Ali Kalora certainly has other advantages that make MIT determined to choose him as leader. Ali Kalora is said to have the ability to survive. He is also good at disguise: he can disguise himself as a farmer, a local, etc. Despite not having good organizational skills, Ali is believed to be close to Islamic militant groups in Mindanao, the Philippines and Bima, West Nusa Tenggara. This benefits him to find additional members and ammunition.

ISIS in the Jakarta Group

Compiled from Court Decision Letter 140/Pid.Sus/2018/PN Jkt.Sel. and Court Decision Number: 388/PID.B/2016/PTDKI, the Jakarta ISIS group was formed by Aman Abdurrahman and Iwan Darmawan Muntho alias Rois who are both languishing in the Kembang Prison, Nusa Kambangan. After establishing the group, Aman Abdurrahman summoned his loyal followers to visit him at the Nusa Kambangan Prison. Aman explained about the caliphate of ISIS and the obligation of all Muslims to pledge allegiance to the caliph. Aman then led the allegiance process and asked his congregation to immediately form a group that could be used as a forum for the ISIS struggle in Indonesia. Rois then asked Abu Gar and Ahmad Muhazin to form a group according to Aman Abdurrahman's direction. This group later carried out the attack in Thamrin.

From the above data processing, 19 names were detected as actors behind the Thamrin bombing case. This group is affiliated with ISIS and carried out terror attacks in Jakarta as an implementation of ISIS orders. This data processing shows that the actor who has the most communication line is Aman Abdurrahman. However, the big data of the Jakarta group does not show many traces of communication between actors in the network. Actors connected to other actors also appear to be limited to connecting with other actors in the network. Perhaps, this is due to two things: first, the closed nature of the Jakarta group, they operate underground, therefore they try their best not to be conspicuous to the public, one of which is by limiting the rate of communication between their members.

Second, the speed of communication between members is limited because the two main characters, Aman Abdurrahman and Rois, are still in Nusa Kambangan Prison. This condition certainly does not allow group members to communicate openly and frequently. The actor in the Jakarta network who left the most traces of communication was Abu Gar, and that was only for four actors. Similar to the MIT group, the findings in the Jakarta group –again– break the basic argument of the Structural Gap theory as referred to by Coleman (1998) which states that the more relationships built, the higher the capital owned by ego actors (Eriyanto, 2014: 215-216). Because in fact, the high and low capital of the ego actor in the network is not determined by the number of relationships that are built, but the quality of the relationships. In the context of the Jakarta group, although the actors have a very small number of relationships, this group was able to prepare and execute attacks quite neatly and effectively.

Analysis of the Network Groupings shows that the number of nodes in the Jakarta cluster network is 11, while the number of ties is 19. The slight difference between node and ties in the Jakarta ISIS group network indicates that there are not many structural holes in the network. This actors in the Jakarta group network are more likely to connect with other actors, although in some cases, they still rely on certain actors to build ties with other members. The density level shown is also very small, namely 0.173. The highest score for the density level is 1, which means the number of links equals the number of possible links that appear. Therefore, this low score indicates that the communication bonds within the Jakarta group network are not very intensive.

In this group, as in the MIT group, the communication pattern was mostly one-way. There are almost no traces of two-way (interactive) communication within the Jakarta ISIS group. This could be due to the fact that the Jakarta ISIS group is also operating clandestinely. They must avoid high-intensity communication in order to keep their group from being spotted by the authorities. In the Jakarta ISIS group, the actor who has the highest click score is Abu Gar. He is not a new player in the terrorist network in Indonesia. Prior to joining the Jakarta ISIS group, Abu Gar was the chairman of Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) Ambon. This group is strongly affiliated with Aman Abdurrahman, however, Abu Gar admits that he has never interacted directly – especially in terms of giving orders – with Aman Abdurrahman; all this time he had followed Rois' orders.

A fairly tenuous score is also shown in the Diameter section, the Jakarta group has a score of 4. This score is the same as that in the ISIS Poso (MIT) group, which means that on average

each actor in the network must pass 4 obstacles before arriving at the group. Actors in the target network. With the same diameter score, the Jakarta ISIS group also has similarities in terms of hierarchical rigidity. In this group, as in the MIT group, communication patterns occurred more in a one-way, top-bottom, not much trace of two-way (interactive) communication in this group.

The reason is that the Jakarta ISIS group also operates underground. They seem to avoid high-intensity communication because this actually increases the risk of the network being exposed and eventually being arrested by state officials. The number of active and counted actors in the system is 19. There are other possible actors in the Jakarta ISIS network, yet names that emerged from the police investigation were 19, two names of whom also appeared in the MIT group, namely Aman Abdurrahman and Bahrin Naim.

The data above shows the influence and role of actors in the network. From that it appears that the actors with an outdeg – meaning the most active in contacting other actors, are Abu Gar and Rois. Both have an outdeg of 4; that means, Abu Gar and Rois have contacted 4 actors. However, the index score is low, which is 2, this means that although Abu Gar and Rois have managed to contact 4 actors, they have only been contacted 2 times by other actors. This pattern shows that Abu Gar and Rois often play the role of giving directions or orders that are top-down.

Both only contacts, give directions, and orders. From the facts of the trial, it is known that Rois and Abu Gar played an important role in planning and carrying out the Thamrin bomb attack. Abu Gar, who was the most flexible because of his position outside the prison, coordinated, plotted and recruited. Meanwhile Rois, although languishing in the Nusa Kambangan Prison, remains in control of the Jakarta ISIS group. In fact, the perpetrators involved in this attack were Rois' chosen people, they were Dian Juni, Afif alias Sunakim, Muhammad Ali, and Ahmad Muhazan; the four died 'in action'

ISIS in the Surabaya Group

The next ISIS network in Indonesia is the Surabaya group. They carried out acts of terror on May 13-14 2018 by attacking three churches, police stations, and flats in Surabaya and Sidoarjo areas. R. Dita Oepriarto alias Abu Halim, the emir/leader of the halaqah in the Surabaya area, carried out terror acts with his family (wife and children) by means of istihadi (suicide bombing) in three churches in Surabaya at around 07.30 WIB. Then Anton Ferdianto, a member of JAD halaqah in the Surabaya area, carried out acts of terror in the same way at Flats Along at around 20.00 WIB. It didn't stop there, the next day another suicide bombing attack was carried out by Tri Bondan alias Pak Tri and his family at the Surabaya Police Station at around 08.30 WIB. Tri Bondan is a member of JAD halaqah in the Surabaya area.

At that time, the JAD group was led by Zainal Anshori who also served as the Amir of Central JAD. In East Java, the leadership of JAD is Syamsul Arifin alias Abu Umar alias Syarif alias Pakde Purwanto. Zainal Anshori appointed Syamsul Arifin as the leader of JAD East Java in

the period June-July 2016. Syamsul also moved quickly by forming an organizational structure with the following composition:

The Surabaya ISIS group, particularly those related to the bomb attacks on three churches, contains seventeen members from various regions in East Java. Aman Abdurrahman, who is languishing in the Nusa Kambangan prison, established communication with ISIS in Surabaya through Zainal Anshori (as chairman of Central JAD) who then passed it on to Syamsul Arifin (chairman of JAD East Java). It was from Syamsul that all instructions were spread to all the other members.

The main character in this group is the Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) network which involves Aman Abdurrahman as the founder, Zainal Anshori as the head of JAD Central, and Syamsul Arifin as the leader of JAD East Java. From the very beginning, even before this group was named JAD, the main purpose of establishing this group was to become a forum for ISIS in Indonesia. Aman Abdurrahman, even though at that time he was languishing in the Nusa Kambangan Prison, could continue to build communication with the recitation congregations and their followers who regularly visit. At first, Aman summoned Abu Musa, Zainal Anshori and Abu Khatib to discuss the possibility of establishing an organization that would become ISIS' arm in Indonesia.

Aman then suggested to his three loyal followers to form an ISIS support organization. This organization will later be intended for several purposes, some of which are: as a forum to unite ISIS supporters in Indonesia who come from various Islamic organizations, prepare Indonesian Muslims to welcome the arrival of the Khilafah Islamiyah, unite the understanding and wisdom of Ansar Daulah supporters, and prepare people who want to go to jihad. On the basis of these goals, Abu Musa later named this group Jamaah Ansharut Daulah alias Jamaah Supporting Daulah (the ISIS-style country).

In the Surabaya group, Zainal Ansori was seen as a key actor because he had a special line of communication with the highest leader of the ISIS group at that time, Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi, of course through the intermediary of Aman Abdurrahman. Even so, the central figure in the Surabaya ISIS network is Syamsul Arifin. He has the most connectivity paths. It is at the heart of communication on this network because the rate of information seems to gather on it and spread from it.

The number of nodes in the Surabaya cluster network is 17 while ties are 111. The very high difference (highest compared to the two previous cities) between the node and ties indicates that there are a lot of structural holes in this network. The density level shown is also very small, namely 0.408. The highest score for the density level is 1, which means the number of links equals the number of possible links that appear. Therefore, this low score indicates that the communication bond in the Surabaya group network is not very intensive.

A fairly tenuous score is also shown in the diameter section, the Surabaya group has a score of 3. The diameter referred to here is the distance between two actors to interact. If the distance (diameter) has a score of 3, it means that on average each actor in the network has to go through 3 steps to interact with other actors. The more barriers that must be traversed to interact, the

more indicative of the level of rigidity of the hierarchy in a group. Small and open networks generally only require small steps to build interaction with other actors. Obstacles in this group can be read as actors. The number of active and counted actors in the system is 17. The actual number of network members is small, but the gap is large (3); each actor on average must go through (or be mediated) by 3 other actors before being able to interact with the intended actor.

The highest network density score is in the ISIS group in Surabaya. The number of ties in the Surabaya network reaches 111 ties, this shows that there are a lot of structural holes in this network. The average geodesic distance in the Surabaya group is smaller than the Poso and Jakarta ISIS groups, which is 3. Meanwhile for the number of clicks, the communication network of the Surabaya ISIS group far outperforms the two previous groups, they have nine clicks (network grouping).

In all of these cliques, the actor who is always connected is Syamsul Arifin. The East Java JAD chairman is connected with all members of the group, except for Sheikh Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi, this is because the top ISIS leader is not directly involved in the membership of the ISIS Surabaya network. With his position in all clique groups, Syamsul Arifin is the heart of the ISIS group in Surabaya. He was the one who pumped the communication lines in the ISIS group in Surabaya. For his role, information spreads quickly and evenly to all members of the network.

The Surabaya group also has many empty holes in the cohesion path. This indicates that the communication traffic on this network is not congested; still often stutters. Even so, the Surabaya group proved successful in carrying out a dangerous terror attack. This again shows that the level of cohesion is not the main key to the quality of network communication.

Conclusion

In general, the ISIS group in Indonesia in the Poso and Jakarta networks is more closed than the ISIS group in Surabaya. The cohesion value in the Poso and Jakarta groups is also much lower than the Surabaya group, this indicates the sparse communication lines between group members in the two networks. The number of ties on communication lines in the two groups above is also low (Jakarta, 19; Poso, 25). While in the Surabaya group, network actors are connected to each other, the lines of communication also appear to be more open.

In this section, the data collected from the research object will be analysed and matched with the initial hypothesis based on the Structural Gap theory. Neuman in *Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches* (2003) suggests that the figures obtained from careful calculations are explained in the form of a simple table and then discussed with the initial hypothesis that was built (Neuman, 2013: 478)

The following table contains the findings data on the three ISIS groups in Indonesia:

Levels of ISIS Network Structure in Indonesia: A Study of Three Regions

	ISIS Poso	ISIS Jakarta	ISIS Surabaya
Network Structure	Low	Low	High
Network Grouping	Low	Medium	High
Dominant Actor	Low	Low	High

For the Network Structure category, only the ISIS group in Surabaya had high levels, while the other two groups, ISIS in Poso and ISIS in Jakarta, had low levels. The variables measured in this category are cohesion or connectedness between group members. If the Poso group featured Ali Kalora and the Jakarta group presented Rois as the actor with the highest cohesion in their respective groups, then the Surabaya group had more than one actor with a high level of cohesion. Even so, as with the Poso and Jakarta groups, the Surabaya ISIS group also leaves many group members who are not connected to each other so that traffic in the Indonesian ISIS network is not congested.

However –and this is important-, not solid is not the same as not strong. The ISIS network in Indonesia does not have a high level of cohesion, there are many holes in the communication lines of its network members, but their communication is strong. This is proven by their 'success' in planning and carrying out terror attacks. Never forget the fact that the main brain of this network, Aman Abdurrahman, was languishing in a correctional facility when the ISIS network began to grow in Indonesia, yet he was still able to hold the main control over ISIS networks in Indonesia.

This study also finds that the number of communication channels in the network is not always in line with the social capital owned by the actor. In the MIT group, for example, Ali Kalora has ten communication lines, while Abu Tholut only has two. However, despite only having two communication lines, Abu Tholut has stronger power in the MIT group because the two actors connected to him are senior officials, those are Ustaz Yasin and Santoso, Meanwhile Ali Kalora, despite having more communication lines, did not in fact increase social capital within the MIT group.

The data collected from the three ISIS groups above shows that the number of paths almost never contributes to the highs and lows capital of ego actor in a terrorist network, what is more important than the number of relationship lines is the quality of the relationship, which is not how many relationships you have, but to whom the actor relationships can be built.

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