

# THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN CONFRONTING THE ARMED AND POLITICAL FREE PAPUA MOVEMENT TO DEFEND STATE SOVEREIGNTY

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## Abstract

The development of post-reform GPM underwent a metamorphosis by using a political approach and utilizing technology. Taking into account the results of surveys and studies that the development of GPM has increased quite significantly both politically through the Free West Papua movement and the ULMWP movement since 2014 and victims of armed movements through KKB and KST actions in the Mountains have continued to increase in 2020 (115 cases) and 2021 (96 cases). The purpose of this study is to analyze the factors for the development of the Free Papua Movement and to analyze the role of intelligence in dealing with the armed and political Free Papua Movement to safeguard national sovereignty. This study uses a post-positivist approach with a mixed method method in collecting data both surveys and interviews. Primary data was obtained through in-depth interviews with key informants and focus group discussions. Secondary data was obtained from task force data, intelligence data, ministries/agencies, survey results and official data from government portals. The results of the study show that the factors that led to the development of the Free Papua Movement are firstly the internationalization of the Papua issue, secondly; factor in the development of Information Communication and Technology (ICT); Third, the Youth Group Transformation factor or generational transition; Fourth, the factor of Foreign Involvement and lobbying power. Based on the threat analysis the Free Papua Movement in Papua is in the Threat Coefficient indicating the threat is in a high threats condition (high), namely 15.8 (rounded to 16). The second research result is that the role of intelligence in Papua is very significant, but intelligence faces various obstacles, namely intelligence human resources that are less qualified, operational planning that is not mature, limited facilities and infrastructure, limited funds, policies that are not yet in favor of intelligence, poor inter-sectoral coordination. Intelligence also faces various challenges, namely the militancy of the Free Papua Movement, the Evolution of the Free Papua Movement, Government programs that have not been successful, support from non-state actors, and foreign involvement. Intelligence must utilize technology to counter opinion and prepare various scenarios to confront each organization. Intelligence needs to encourage strong local leadership in Papua, local leadership that needs to be supported by the center is also important to have a nationalist spirit and be pro to the Republic of Indonesia so that national stability is maintained. The recommendations in this study are related to policy proposals, operational and tactical matters. Intelligence Strengthening is urgently needed, including the involvement of the Oktahelix Actor in handling GPM in Papua.

**Keywords:** Intelligence Role, Free Papua Movement, State Sovereignty

## INTRODUCTION

Basically, sovereignty is the top power of a country. Sovereignty or sovereignty comes from the Latin *suveranus* which means top. Sovereignty means the superiority of the state which implies the highest authority regarding the law and its constitution. Article 1 paragraph 2 of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia emphasizes that the sovereignty of the State of Indonesia lies in the hands of the people and is carried out according to the 1945 Constitution.

In the 2020 Meeting of the Ministry of Defense, the President of Indonesia, Ir. Joko Widodo that the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia is fixed and cannot be negotiated or negotiated. The stability of national security is currently being tested by the existence of a major challenge that is felt by the existence of an armed and political separatist movement in Papua.

Armed separatist movements and politics are two basic things from the problems that have occurred so far in Papua and have received attention from the government, although their handling has not been optimal. Disruptions to separatism in this paper include disturbances from separatist groups in the provinces of Papua and West Papua who often carry out acts of armed terror, political movements which often internationalize the issue of Papua.

In updating LIPI's 2012 roadmap, it was stated that in looking at the Papua issue there are several actors who have an interest, namely the Government, the Free Papua Organization, the Presidium of the Papua Council, the Papuan Customary Council, tribal chiefs, churches and NGOs. Furthermore, there were 3 new actors after the death of Theys Eluay in 2010, namely actors from Youth (Youth), ULMWP and the Papua Peace Network. The number of actors involved certainly makes the handling of conflict in Papua more complex due to the many interests involved, so the government cannot handle it in a linear or normal way. A systematic approach is needed that is able to handle conflict in order to create national security stability in Papua, one of which is prioritizing the intelligence approach in mediating the security approach and the welfare approach. Intelligence based on Law No. 17 of 2011 is knowledge, organization and activities related to the formulation of policies, national strategies and decision-making based on analysis of information and facts collected through work methods for detection and early warning in the context of prevention, deterrence , and countermeasures against any threat to national security.

The role of Intelligence itself is to foster legal certainty, foster security of public order (civil order), law enforcement, build defense capability, protect society from natural disasters (public safety from disasters), maintain national security of a country (save national security). With its functions related to investigation, security and fundraising. Intelligence has a significant role in maintaining the stability of a region along with security forces, including the various escalations of conflicts in Papua.

From this background it can be explained that the role of Intelligence is needed in assisting ministries/agencies due to the not optimal efforts in dealing with the Free Papua Movement. This also shows that the government's strategic efforts have not been optimal in terms of counter-propaganda and diplomacy in international forums in order to protect the sovereignty of the Indonesian state. In addition, the central government has also formed an integrated team chaired by the Vice President, Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs, Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs and Investment, Coordinating Minister for Human Development and Culture, Minister for Home Affairs, Minister of Health and KSP (7 Ministries/Institutions) to handle issues in Papua based on Presidential Decree No.20 of 2020 as well as 43 Ministries/Institutions under the legal umbrella of Presidential Instruction No. 9 of 2020. The effectiveness of these

ministries/agencies cannot be seen because it has only been established for 2 years. With the end of the 2001-2021 Special Autonomy policy, the government also extended volume two of the Special Autonomy policy with the addition of various new policies such as an additional budget and the existence of a new agency, namely the BP3OKP. Of course, this new body needs to be given various inputs so that the implementation of the integrated team can run optimally, especially the important thing to pay attention to is the role of Intelligence. The role of Intelligence in ensuring security stability in Papua and providing various policies in Papua is very important. From this background, research questions can be formulated, namely First, what factors have caused the Free Papua Movement to increase in escalation to date? Second, what is the role of Intelligence in handling the Free Papua Movement to Maintain State Sovereignty?

## **LIBRARY RESEARCH**

Prior to integration with Indonesia, both Papua and West Papua Provinces were known internationally as West Papua or Netherlands New Guinea (NNG). It is called NNG because the population is like the Guinean population in Africa but is a Dutch colony (Netherlands). . Various literature and other research results show that the roots of problems in Papua are initiated by different perspectives in viewing the history of Papua's integration into Indonesia. These differences in historical perspectives have sparked different interpretations of Papua as a social entity with a state.

Since the New Order era, the existence of the Free Papua Organization (OPM) has also been a concern of intelligence and defense actors but not as open as it is today because the press is not free to report these things. After the 1998 Reformation, the pros and cons regarding the history of Papua reappeared along with the opening of press freedom. The Free Papua Organization, which was considered to exist only in the forest, has in fact morphed into an organization with a political movement, the movement used various issues and opinions that were rolled out massively by taking advantage of press freedom and freedom of opinion which became the spirit of reform at that time. This mobilization of opinion does not only stop at the discourse on the history of Papuan integration, but also leads to efforts to break away from Indonesia unconstitutionally or treason. Various attempts have been made by political groups including criticizing the Indonesian government to show its existence.

On the other hand, the Indonesian government continues to strive to solve various problems in Papua, including increasing welfare, with the hope that if prosperity is achieved, the desire for independence will decrease. This can be seen through the strategic policies of the Government of Indonesia in advancing Papua by giving wider authority to the Provinces of Papua and West Papua, including through Law Number 21 of 2001 concerning Special Autonomy (Otsus). However, after 20 years have passed, the form of the Special Autonomy policy cannot be felt in parts of Papua, especially in the mountainous areas. Many Ministries and Institutions (K/L) are given the mandate to carry out the preparation of policy regulations and carry out development programs including involving the Regional Governments of Papua and West

Papua Provinces. The government views that a welfare-based strategic policy in the Papua region is the right choice.

In its implementation, President Joko Widodo has launched a holistic approach, and has implemented various welfare efforts by prioritizing infrastructure development and support for the community's economy. In the process of increasing welfare, various social dynamics have occurred which have caused new problems in security stability in the Papua region. A number of factual problems were also present, especially interference from separatist groups who carried out acts of terror that affected the implementation of development programs in Papua. Therefore, the central government is taking various steps to encourage Ministries/Agencies to have more synergy in improving welfare. President Ir. Joko Widodo also asked the Ministries/Institutions to carry out various ways to create an advanced, prosperous, peaceful and dignified Papuan society..

### **The Concept and Theory of Separatism**

Political separatism is a movement of a group of people or a group of regions to separate themselves and gain sovereignty from the main country. Groups that have aspirations to secede generally have a distinctive national consciousness. In general, separatism is a radical form of cultural regionalism and political regionalism which has similar basic characteristics, namely the existence of similarities in forms and methods to form distinct and unique regional identities. The difference between the two is the goal of what they want to achieve, starting from regional nationalism which still supports existing nation-states, demands for autonomy to a certain extent, to demands for independence in the form of secession (Augusteijn, 2012). Regarding secession, the Free Papua Movement will use various methods to achieve their goals, both peaceful and violent methods involving armed forces and terror. There are two views in the literature regarding the policies implemented by several governments in dealing with separatist conflicts, namely reputation theory and cost-benefit calculation models (Fujikawa, 2017).

Walter (2006, 2009) The Concept and Theory of Separatism developing reputation theory in the context of war for independence. According to Walter, if a multi-ethnic state offers accommodation to separatists then other ethnic groups may also demand the same rights.. Toft (2003) argued that multi-ethnic countries fought against separatists for fear that accommodative policies could set a precedent. Conversely, if separatist demands are strongly opposed then separatist movements can be minimized. That is why governments in multi-ethnic countries have steadfastly refused to make concessions to separatists.

There are some parties who are skeptical of reputation theory (Nilsson, 2010; Forsberg, 2013) have the view that it is better to provide accommodation to the separatist movement if the costs to be incurred to resolve the conflict are too expensive. This view is called the 'cost-benefit calculation model' and has become an influential perspective in efforts to end the war. (Zartman, 2000; Bapat, 2005). This model explains that the central government will accommodate separatists, as long as the costs incurred by the conflict are very high. This reputation theory and cost-benefit model are also related to the two arguments about the effect

of granting autonomy. Some argue that providing accommodation to separatist demands will only strengthen their ability and will to secede. In his study, Mc Gibbon (2004) also mentioned that special autonomy that was not implemented properly would trigger the development of separatism. Connell (2006) found that granting autonomy to separatist regions would only increase the will and capacity for separatism. Hardline politicians agree with Cornell's views. This view is the reason why hardliners prefer to suppress separatist movements without accommodation because granting autonomy will not be able to help end separatism. Different views were expressed. Horowitz (2000) which stated that the granting of autonomy would not jeopardize national unity if the separatist leaders and elites in the regions received certain incentives from the central government which caused them not to want to secede. Softline politicians agree with this view, believing that separatist supporters would remain in a unitary state if it gained significant autonomy from the central government.

Separatism itself has a definition that is closely related to insurgency. Insurgency can be defined as a rebellion carried out between parties who are not in power against those in power, where the parties who are not in power consciously use their political abilities; such as forming organized experts, using propaganda media, demonstrations and using violence aimed at destroying, reformulating or defending one or several basic aspects of political legitimacy. There are seven types of insurgency movements, namely: 1. Anarchists; 2. Egalitarian; 3. Traditional; 4. Pluralist; 5. Succession; 6. Reformers; 7. Conservationist.

Meanwhile, the Papuan Separatist Movement in the field of independent politics tends to approach the reformist movement, which underlies the movement from drastic changes in the NKRI political system (namely since reform), namely through the target of a referendum and wanting to prove to the world (UN) that the 1969 Act was flawed and illegal so that it succeeded with idealism. "Free Papua" which will separate itself from the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. The political process that takes place in each country is certainly different, sometimes the political crisis that occurs causes political transformation which is used by minority groups to convey their demands (Liddle, 2001). The most extreme form of these demands is the desire to secede or better known as separatism.

In various literature on political science and government, political separatism is a movement by a group of people or a group of regions to separate themselves and gain sovereignty from the main country. Groups that have aspirations to secede generally have a distinctive national consciousness. Separatist movements have taken various means to achieve their goals, both peaceful and violent methods involving armed force and terror. On the surface, separatist movements often appear to be heavily colored by nationalism or fanaticism towards certain ethnicities or religions. The thing that is more dominant is due to the involvement of minority groups in making political decisions or power as well as the socio-economic inequality they suffer. In the book "The Dynamics of Secession", Bartkus (2004) describes separatism. Bartkus stated that the secession of a country is inseparable from the process of political disintegration. Furthermore, still in the same literature Ernst Haas mentions that political integration is a process in which political actors in several different political systems are persuaded to shift their allegiance, expectations, and political activities to a new center, an institution that has or



claims jurisdiction over pre-existing sub-system. Conversely, the decision to secede is an example of political disintegration, in which political actors in one or more sub-systems withdraw their loyalties from a central jurisdiction to focus on their own.

### **Intelligence Role**

Intelligence is a scientific discipline where there is no universal agreement to mention the meaning of intelligence. Intelligence (intelligence) comes from English which means intelligence. This is because in the discipline of intelligence, what is known as thinking is known, namely the ability to process and optimize brain performance to solve various problems. In Law no. 17 of 2011 concerning State Intelligence, Article 6 paragraph (1) and paragraph (3) it is written that the duties of BIN as an instrument of the state include security. A detailed explanation of what is meant by security is a series of activities that are carried out in a planned and directed manner to prevent and/or counter efforts, work, intelligence activities, and/or opposing parties that are detrimental to national interests and security. The implementation of intelligence functions takes many forms. Activities such as reconnaissance, investigation, surveillance, infiltration (surreptitious entry), wiretapping, prevention and early deterrence as well as propaganda and psychological warfare are permitted according to Law 17 of 2011. Regarding the coordination function, the main creed of intelligence is silence (secret) and compartmentalization (each ignorant of the other's duties). This is important so that an intelligence operation does not leak and have fatal consequences.

### **The Roots of the Problem in Papua**

There are several things that can be formulated as the root causes of the Papua problem based on the author's assumptions, namely related to the history of Papua's integration with the Republic of Indonesia, human rights violations and the ongoing conflict in Papua, the implementation of the special autonomy policy for Papua and West Papua which is considered less successful, foreign interests in Papua and related horizontal and vertical conflicts in Papua. Of course Papua's sovereignty within the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia is not a discourse but also a legal fact because it has been written in the New York Agreement. Regardless of the "New York Agreement" and UN Resolutions, without the Pepera Papua is actually part of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia because there is international law, namely the doctrine of "uti possidetis juris". This doctrine stated that the state inherited its former colonies, the Dutch East Indies at that time included Papua and automatically based on this doctrine the Dutch colonies (including Papua within) became part of Indonesia. The implementation of the 1969 Act was held on July 14, 1969 through deliberation for consensus. The deliberations were attended by 1025 people representing 8 districts in Papua. At that time, the population of Papua was 809,327 people and 95% of them expressed their desire to continue joining (integration with Indonesia) by raising their hands. This historic event was witnessed by representatives of Australia, the Netherlands and the United Nations. (ANRI, Pepera, 1969). For some people who initiated the Free Papua Movement, the Pepera was considered illegitimate because the process was not "one man one vote" like today's democracy. There is even controversy that considers that members of the Papua Deliberative Council are being

pressured by the military (Indonesian military) so that their desire to remain part of Indonesia is deemed invalid.

Pros and cons regarding the history of Papua resurfaced after the reformation when the tap for freedom of the press was opened and groups with different opinions (wanting a referendum with the goal of an independent Papua) were again free to voice their opinions. The problem of different perceptions about history is only a small part of the problems that exist in Papua. The LIPI Papua Road Map, which was launched in 2009 and updated in 2016, concludes that the Papuan problem concerns three things: First, related to the internationalization of Papua; Second, related to the settlement of human rights issues; Third, related to the development and implementation of Special Autonomy.

Based on the opinions of several experts who were invited by the Special Committee for the DPR RI when drafting the special autonomy law for Papua, it was conveyed that there were several problems faced by Papua, namely the low level of welfare of the Papuan people (as measured by four areas, namely education, health, economy, and infrastructure), perceptions differences regarding the integration of Papua into the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia and the desire to maintain a single Papuan value system, tradition or civilization. In terms of substance and political intent, Law Number 21 of 2001 concerning Special Autonomy (Otsus) was created as an instrument to resolve four root problems in Papua. The four roots of the problem are the failure of development, the marginalization and discrimination of indigenous Papuans, state violence and accusations of human rights violations, as well as the history and political status of the Papua region. The hope is that Papua can be maintained within the Republic of Indonesia and at the same time the aspirations of the indigenous Papuan people are accommodated in a fair and dignified manner. Dialogue needs to be held to resolve differences in understanding between the central government and Papuan leaders regarding the root of the problem and how to overcome it. It is also necessary to have the same understanding of the Papua Special Autonomy Law. This is because the central government believes that a number of articles in the Special Autonomy Law are considered to endanger the existence of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia and have consistently hindered its implementation. As a result, Otsus was not fully implemented and lost legitimacy in the eyes of most people in Papua. Meanwhile Richard Chauvel, an expert on Papuan political history, concluded that there were at least four basic problems that could be identified, namely; (a) Disappointment because the land of Papua has become part of Indonesia, (b) There is competition felt by the land elite of Papua with officials from outside the land of Papua who have dominated the government since Dutch colonialism, (c) Economic development and governance in the land of Papua are different, and ( d) The marginalization of indigenous Papuans due to the presence of migrants. These views became legitimacy for disaffected groups which gave birth to groups pro-independence for the land of Papua.

## METHOD

In this study, the Post-positivism paradigm was used. The post-positivism paradigm is considered that reality is real according to natural laws, but on the other hand, humans cannot get the truth if researchers are not directly involved with that reality (critical realism). Post-positivist research is based on positivist views related to forecasting and control issues, but tries to develop a different understanding of other things to answer the criticisms leveled by positivist groups.

The result of the research is the interaction between humans and the universe which is full of problems and is always changing. The focus of post-positivism studies is human actions as an expression of a decision. To answer the second question after conducting in-depth interviews and discussions regarding the Free Papua Movement and the role of intelligence.

Data collection techniques related to the role of direct observation, literature studies, field notes including the results of online interviews and voice and video recordings. Literature study is also needed to obtain information that explains and supports the research concept. In this study, qualitatively data were collected through in-depth interviews with informants according to interview guidelines.

Secondary data was collected through a literature review of government publications, research publications, intelligence reports, task force reports, newspaper articles and materials downloaded from the internet. To deal with the current condition of the Covid-19 pandemic, the survey was carried out online through the Google survey application which was distributed to Indigenous Papuans (OAP) as well as the task force on duty in Papua as well as the Regional Intelligence Agency and members of the security forces in Papua and West Papua..

After the data is processed, the next step is to analyze the data. Data analysis technique is a way to process data and information so that the characteristics of the data become easy to understand and also useful for finding solutions to problems, which is primarily to answer problems in research. The data analysis phase includes data management, data refinement and concept development.

The data analysis technique in this study is qualitative analysis which is an inductive analysis because the analysis process starts from a collection of data. Data that will be obtained from the field, will be selected and then categorized and stored according to the category. Data will be narrowed down and discarded as irrelevant, this is done because qualitative research is flexible and open to new possibilities in the field. Furthermore, a deductive analysis was carried out. The data obtained from the interview results will be transcribed first and then classified into categories (categories derived from theory) which will make it easier for researchers to carry out analysis. Furthermore, the data will be narrated to assist discussion in research. The narrative will be carried out through concept development after the data is interpreted.

As for this study used triangulation of data sources. Triangulation itself is a guiding step for various data sources, researchers, theories, and methods in a study of a particular social phenomenon. Triangulation of data sources is the collection of data from different sources



using the same method. The three types of data sources that must be considered are subject, space and time.

The research was carried out in Jakarta to several informants (key informants) who understood the problem and through online surveys through questionnaires that would be distributed via Whatsapp..

## **RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

### **Factors that led to the development of the Free Papua Movement**

#### **Historical differences with other Daweah in Indonesia**

The Dutch government agreed to negotiate to sign the United Nations Agreement known as the New York Agreement on August 15, 1962 which was ratified through UN Resolution no. 1752. The handover of Niuw Guinea to Indonesia was carried out with administrative responsibility through UNTEA on 1 October 1962.

Due to the location of the Papuan people's settlements, which at that time were still mostly in isolated areas and added to the situation of human resources, who at that time did not know much about literacy, the implementation of the Act of Free Choice in several areas was carried out by voting represented by several religious and traditional leaders. Through the "act of free choice" or Pepera which was carried out in 8 cities/districts, it is proven that the Papuan people still think that they are an inseparable part of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.

So that the UN General Assembly convened and confirmed the wishes of the people of Papua/West Irian by issuing UN Resolution No. 2504 which states that Papua/West Irian is part of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. The UN then sent Ortiz Sanz as its envoy to deliver the UN Resolution. From the Pepera's journey it can be seen that there is not a single clause that requires the implementation of the Pepera with the principle of "one man one vote".

The Pepera incident in Papua is a series of historical events that do not exist in other regions in Indonesia, the Papua region was only recognized by the United Nations as part of Indonesia on August 15, 1962 through the signing of the New York Agreement initiated by the United States (Ricklefs, 2008). The Indonesian government carried out a gradual referendum in the form of a Popular Opinion (Perpera) on 14 July – 2 August 1969 which involved the Papua Deliberative Council (Djopari, 1993).

The DMP consists of 1025 people representing 8 districts in Papua to express their attitude regarding the integration of West Papua with Indonesia, where 95% choose to join by appointment (Djopari, 1993). The Act of 1969 was witnessed by representatives from Australia, the Netherlands and the United Nations, so that the territory of Papua or West Irian was recognized as an integral part of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia both de jure and de facto.

After the reform era rolled around and the emergence of press freedom in Indonesia, the issue of Free Papua became an intense discussion where the legitimacy of the results of the 1969 Act was often used as a propaganda issue and questioned again by figures from the Papuan

separatist movement. In research on the 1969 Pepera, Free Papua leaders considered the 1969 Pepera to be undemocratic and did not represent the choices of all Papuan people at that time (Rusli, 2006). Apart from that, the presence of non-Papuans who were involved in the 1969 Pepera also became an obstacle in representing the desires and integration of the Papuan people with Indonesia (Warinussy in Anadolu Agency, 2019). Meanwhile, if you look at the composition of the 1969 Pepera executors, they are as follows:

**Table 1: Comparison of the Implementation of the 1969 Act**

| Waktu        | Regency            | Member of the Act's Consultative Council | Total population |
|--------------|--------------------|--|------------------|
| 14 July 1969 | Merauke            | 175                                      | 144.171          |
| 16 July 1969 | Jayawijaya         | 175                                      | 165.000          |
| 19 July 1969 | Paniai             | 175                                      | 156.000          |
| 23 July 1969 | Fak-fak            | 175                                      | 43.187           |
| 26 July 1969 | Sorong             | 110                                      | 75.474           |
| 29 July 1969 | Manokwari          | 75                                       | 49.875           |
| 31 July 1969 | Teluk Cenderawasih | 130                                      | 91.870           |
| 2 Agust 1969 | Jayapura           | 110                                      | 83.760           |

Source: Djopari (1993)

The differences in the history of integration and the process of sowing nationalism between West Papua and most areas in Indonesia need to be considered in an effort to understand the government's approach to conflict management and efforts to overcome separatism, because these two factors can explain the possibility of two nationalisms and national crises that often appear as triggers for separatism. (Mataray, 2011). In addition, the existence of social inequality and the uneven distribution of economic development are also factors supporting the separatist movement in Papua (Mollet, 2011). These factors have resulted in Papua being labeled as the area of the longest violent conflict in Indonesia (Elisabeth, 2005).

The history of Papua is often debated and is one of the reasons for the emergence of separatist groups. Some of the things that are usually debated are as follows:

- a. The Papuan people have never been involved in determining their own destiny, because in the New York Agreement no Papuans are involved.
- b. Before Indonesia entered in 1962, Papua had actually gained its independence in 1961.
- c. The Pepera held in 1969 was illegal because it was not carried out "one man one vote".

Such propaganda often cannot be countered by security forces or intelligence officers if they do not understand history. By reading the explanation above, we can actually provide enlightenment as part of counter-propaganda. This historical problem illustrates how Papua's integrity within the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia is part of the nation's sovereignty at stake which must always be maintained.

From this explanation, the Papuans themselves have contributed most to the liberation of West Irian from Dutch colonialism, but this has not been widely exposed. So that this should be exposed to the fullest possible extent by changing the names of military units, military bases, defense equipment, and others with the names of Papuan heroes. So that the current generation realizes that it was the Papuans themselves who in the 60s struggled to remain united with their compatriots and Indonesian homeland.

### **Factors for the Internationalization of the Papua Issue**

The first factor is the internationalization of the Papua issue. In the LIPI study (2004: 128) it is written that international pro-independence groups are International Action for West Papua, Oxford Papua Rights Campaign, TAPOL, Cultural Survival, and the Australian West Papua Association (AWPA). These groups are movements of the Papuan diaspora. If traced further, the existence of the diaspora has been alluded to as part of the Papuan resistance groups but has not yet become the focus of discussion. The writings of Robin Osborne (1986:54) and Bilveer Sing (2011:162) state that the struggle of the Papuan diaspora has been carried out in the 1962-1965 period, such as Markus Kasiepo, Nicholas Jouwe, and Herman Wamsiwor. However, because they are too far away from Papua and the differences in views between them, their struggle has not had a significant impact on the political situation in Papua.

Prior to the formation of the ULMWP, the Papuan diaspora personally lobbied politically in various countries on various issues, from human rights violations to reviews of the Pepera (People's Opinion). As a result, members of the British Parliament urged UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to review the Pepera in 2004. Likewise, in the same year, 19 members of the United States Senate urged the UN Secretary General to review the role of the UN in the 1968 Act (WPrO, 2015: 85). This effort is inseparable from the role of the Papuan diaspora in Britain, Vanuatu and the United States.

Three years before the formation of the ULMWP, in July 2001 to be precise, the Papua Damai Network (JDP) held a Papua Peace Conference (KPP) in Jayapura which was attended by representatives of Papuans elected through public consultation. This event involved the Papuan provincial government and was officially opened by the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, Joko Soejanto. The agenda for the conference was to discuss indicators for Papua Land of Peace and at the close of the conference it was stated that there was a need for dialogue to resolve the Papua conflict, as well as the election of five Papuan negotiators, all of whom came from elements of the diaspora. They are (the late) John Otto Ondawame, Rex Rumakiek (Vanuatu), Octovianus Mote (United States), Benny Wenda (England), and Leoni Tanggahma (Netherlands). The selection of this negotiator shows that KPP marks a new chapter in the process of communication between resistance groups in the Land of Papua even though they are still not consolidated, both inside and outside the Land of Papua. Before the KPP, there was only the West Papua National Coalition Liberation Front (WPNCL) which was formed in 2008. After the KPP, two new political fronts were formed, namely the Federal Republic of West Papua (NRFPB) in 2011 and the West Papua National Parliament (PNWP) in 2012.

WPNCCL first registered as an observer at the MSG in January 2013. Then between March and May 2013, WPNCCL leaders lobbied MSG member countries, namely Fiji, New Caledonia, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. Lobbying is supported by many parties, both individuals and organizations, including the NRFPB. In his letter to the President of the NRFPB, Edison Waromi, vice chairman of WPNCCL, Dr. Otto Ondawame, said that “MSG members recognize the right to self-government for the people of West Papua and pay attention to human rights violations in West Papua. And the last thing is that West Papua is not removed from the MSG list and MSG members encourage unity and integrity in the groups fighting for West Papuan independence” (ULMWP, 2015: 38), the MSG Summit in Port Moresby decided that West Papua should re-apply for membership in an inclusive and united manner and to submit its reapplying application to the MSG.

Between October 2013 and October 2014 was a period of reconciliation between leaders of Papuan movement organizations by a team called the Reconciliation Team. Throughout this period, the team held 5 meetings with the leaders and representatives of resistance organizations and facilitated the leaders of the NRFPB, WPNCCL and PNWP to prepare for sending delegates, materials, documents and costs. Meanwhile, the Papuan diaspora lobbied PM Joe Natuman and former PMs Moanna Caracas and Barak Sope. After several delays, the West Papua Leaders Summit was held on 1-6 December in Saralana, Port Villa, Vanuatu. Delegations from within the country, envoys from NRFPB, WPNCCL, PNWP, TPN and observers traveled to Port Moresby, totaling 113 people (ULMWP, 2015:55). Meanwhile, delegations from outside Indonesia headed straight for Vanuatu. Due to uncertainty over funds, documents and other technical issues, they departed from Port Moresby, even though Governor Powes Parkop from PNG had offered plane charters for 50 delegates :

- a. The reconciliation meeting at Port Villa Vanuatu was held from 30 November to 6 December 2014, starting with a pilgrimage to the grave of Otto Ondawame. The NRFPB delegates Octavianus Mote and Jacob Rumbiak coordinated with Edison Waromi in Port Moresby, Benny Wenda coordinated with Buchtar Tabuni, while Rex Rumakiek and Paula Makabory made contact with WPNCCL leaders in PNG. An important debate in this meeting was which group was agreed to be the main organization or form a new coordination forum outside the three main organizations. Apart from that, whether to use the name West Papua or the land of Papua. Even though there was quite a lengthy debate, in response to Barak Sope's suggestion regarding the unity of the movement to be accepted at the MSG, they agreed to form a coordinating forum called the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP). This indicates that the short-term political interest in the formation of the ULMWP is actually the acceptance of West Papua as a member of the MSG. Unity among Papuans both inside and outside the Land of Papua (diaspora) is a prerequisite for them to be accepted into the community of Melanesian countries. These interests have encouraged diaspora activists and leaders of the West Papua movement to be able to overcome the interests of their groups.
- b. The meeting chose Octovianus Mote as Secretary General, Benny Wenda as spokesperson with three members namely Jacob Rumbiak, Rek Rumakiek and Leoni Tanggahma. On

December 6, at the Nakamal traditional house, Saralana, Port Villa, a declaration of unity was agreed, called the Saralana Declaration, which was signed by Edison Waromi (NRFPB), Rex Rumakiek (WPNCL), and Buchtar Tabuni (WPNCL). The signing was witnessed by Senimao Tirsupe Mol Torvakavat (Chief of Malavatumauri National Customs), Pastor Francois Pihaatae (Secretary General of the Pacific Council of Churches Conference), Pastor Shem Tema (Secretary General of the Vanuatu Church Council), and Barak Sope Maautamate (Former PM of Vanuatu). The ULMWP objectives are as follows:

Representing the aspirations of the people of West Papua in the struggle for self-determination using peaceful means :

- a. To coordinate the goal of winning the liberation of West Papua at the international level. For the record, the establishment of the ULMWP did not reduce the role of the three founding organizations but carried out coordination.
- b. Maintaining unity Leaders speak with one voice by acknowledging the diversity of views & personalities and upholding universal human rights principles. The values of democracy and inclusive leadership, respect for differences in customs and religions are upheld in ULMWP.
- c. Building support starting from the subregional, regional, to mobilizing international solidarity to seek political support and gain recognition.

If traced to the roots, the main mission of the formation of the ULMWP is to gain full membership in the MSG. The presence of ULMWP as a new actor has made the Free Papua Movement grow.

### **Faktor Ict (Information And Communication Technology)**

Information and communication technology (ICT) factors are related to technology related to the collection, collection, processing, storage, dissemination, and presentation of information (Jamal Ma'mur Asmani, 2011: 99). Bambang Warsita (2008: 135) argues that information technology is the facilities and infrastructure (hardware, software, useware) systems and methods for obtaining, sending, processing, interpreting, storing, organizing, and using data in a meaningful way. ICT can be divided into three types, namely: first, ICT as a media (auxiliary tool) education, namely only as a complement to clarify the descriptions presented. Second, ICT as a source, namely as a source of information and seeking information. Third, ICT as a learning system.

Widjojo (2009: 2) compares conventional Papuan pro-independence groups, for example, guerrillas from the Free Papua Organization (OPM) or the Presidium Council of Papua (PDP) with other groups abroad who have "advantages". These advantages are, the coordination of the action is very fast, integrated, dynamic, and the reach is very wide. International, national and regional coordination takes place in an integrated and simultaneous manner by utilizing communication technology, such as SMS, internet (email, website), very intensively. The campaign was carried out in aggressive ways. The process of transformation and formation of "progressive activists" also seems to be carried out seriously through readings that breathe left



ideology which are used as modules in the training and political education of young people. Most of the classic writings concerning progressive theory are taken from Indo-Marxist websites and several other progressive Indonesian language sites.<sup>1</sup>

### **Youth Group Transformation**

The political process "Reform 1998" which opened democratic spaces throughout the region, gave rise to a resistance movement to claim territory, gave rise to a resistance movement to demand justice in the Land of Papua strengthened (FNMPP, 2008). According to ELSHAM Papua, in the first years after Suharto's fall, Papuans were freed to express their long-held aspirations and feelings, including protesting and even demanding independence (ELSHAM and ICTJ, 2012:8). The birth of reform provides "fresh air" for the people of West Papua to fight for their rights openly, even though the restraints imposed on resistance movements in the Papua region are often found in various forms (Kogoya, 2015).

Democratic actions began by involving civil society political actors such as churches, students, youth, traditional organizations and NGOs, then followed by a meeting of 100 Papuan leaders with President B.J. Habibie on February 26, 1999. In August 1999, representatives of 15 Papuan leaders again told President B.J Habibie to declare that they wanted independence. Then there was systematic consolidation by initiating the Second Papuan People's Congress led by Theys H. Eluays, since then the politics of demanding a referendum and Papuan independence began, and culminated with the killing of Theys Hiyo Eluay on November 11, 2001, with the killing of Theys Hiyo Eluay giving birth and changes a new pattern, youth politics developed amidst the politics of violence carried out by the state and the leadership of the struggle, this young generation is looking for theories, methods and trying to form a New Papuan nationalism that is progressive and different from previous generations.

According to Muridan S. Widjojo, PDP and OPM have the same goal. The difference lies in the strategy built. If OPM uses armed resistance, PDP demands Papuan independence peacefully. In addition, according to Al Rahab (2010, 33), the post-reform Papuan independence movement has undergone a transformation and a shift in movement actors towards young people and students who carry a Papuan identity and oppose Indonesia. Most of this new generation of resistance had been educated at the best universities in Indonesia, such as in Java and Sulawesi.

Furthermore, according to S. Widjojo (2009: 1-2) states that this new layer of resistance groups can be said to be militant, they consist of and are led mostly by Papuan students from the Central highlands, both those with student status in Papua or outside Papua. During the demonstration, this group did not hesitate to clash and attack the security forces. This new group has advantages, namely the coordination of its actions is very fast, integrated, dynamic, and its reach is very wide. International, national and regional coordination takes place in an integrated and simultaneous manner by utilizing communication technology, such as SMS, internet (email, website), very intensively. The campaign was carried out in aggressive ways, Widjojo further explained that these young people did not trust the older Papuan leaders. These young people have no confidence in the older Papuan leaders. This new layer of young people

tends to be very autonomous from other Papuan leaders. This is also confirmed by Al Rahab (2010:33) that the new layer of this movement is filled by the younger generation who were never part of Indonesian politics in the era before the 1998 reform and after. This younger generation could not accept that the old pro-independence political elite were people who had been part of Indonesian politics in the past.

Meanwhile, within the organization, the "senior actors" of the movement still suffer from feudal elitism and patronism, as seen from the tendency to dominate figures from the old traditional leadership types: tribal chiefs, *ondofi* and kings. An important transformation in the youth political movement is strengthening the political struggle by carrying out non-violent civil resistance. If we use the analysis from Jason MacLeod (2011: 72), the movement strategy in Papua uses civil resistance methods with actions outside formal political institutions through protests, strikes, boycotts, using politically charged symbols and social denial. .

According to LIPI researchers Ikrar Nusa Bhakti and Dhuroruddin Mashad (1999:195), after reform and the opening of democratic space, in Papua there has been a shift in the strategy of struggle from armed guerrilla struggle in the forests a la OPM to urban political pressure. Violent and armed methods in fighting for aspirations tend to be abandoned. The process of democracy and community participation as a method of struggle began to be advanced, for example the KNPB strategy which mediated the people to establish and join the Regional People's Parliament (PRD) in 23 Regencies/Cities in Papua. In April 2012 a conference was held to form the West Papua National Parliament (PNWP) and democratically elect the board and leadership of the body by all PRD representatives.

The formation of the PRD and PNWP shows the consistency of the resistance movement spearheaded by progressive youth to create participatory, structured, programmatic and solid means of resistance by demonstrating a peaceful way of struggle.

Another important transformation was the call for and efforts to build a united and national body of struggle that could be accepted by all major factions of the resistance movement and provided organizational and political leadership to all resistance movements. The formation of the ULMWP can be considered as part of the hard work of the national liberation unity project, as the young people have been tirelessly calling for.

### **Factors Of Foreign Involvement**

After the cold war ended, the world could not be mapped clearly by only placing state actors, in this case the legitimate government. Globalization grows non-state actors such as NGOs, international companies, secret or intelligence organization communities and large corporations. Non-state actors that play a very dominant role at this time are Multi National Corporations (MNC) or Global Firms, namely international companies, meaning that political interests in a country, both at the national and regional levels, must pay attention to these world-scale interests. The development of international politics is an important factor in the analysis of problems in Papua.

International support for the Pro-Independence group in Papua creates quite serious complexities for the Government of Indonesia in diplomacy with foreign parties. Even though the Government of Indonesia has strong political legitimacy in this case legitimate sovereignty, the Government becomes weak when it is dealing with the international community regarding democratization, human rights and the environment. These three things constitute a global agenda that is often used in measuring the success or failure of a developing country.

For the Free Papua Movement, this agenda benefits their position and struggle at the international level. The idea to internationalize Papua was one of the recommendations produced at the Second Papuan People's Congress, namely the formation of a team to lobby the international community, including asking for the assistance of the UN Security Council (UNSC) related to the UNSC's role as the guardian of world order, including maintaining security in Papua until a new government is formed. legitimate. In addition, the congress also asked the PDP to conduct dialogue with Indonesia, the Netherlands, the United States and the United Nations.

Positive propaganda for the community should be intense, especially for the educated Papuan people. Educated people should not be easily trapped by the attitude and the Papuan Separatist Movement which wants to separate itself from the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia and be observant and alert to all foreign maneuvers through propaganda actions. One form of maneuver that supports foreign interests so that Papua is separated from Indonesia is a press conference held at the KontraS secretariat, Jakarta which was attended by Wenas Kobagau, Samuel Nawipa, Oktavianus Pogau, Sonny Wanimbo, Yulan Karima and Marthen Goo.

They issued a statement stating that the people of West Papua support the attitude of the Vanuatu delegation who did not join the group to Jakarta and Papua, and also expressed their appreciation and commitment to Vanuatu for supporting the determination of the Papuan people, who are members of the Melanesian family. In their next statement, the Papuan people asked the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) foreign ministers to firmly reject the Joint Statement offered by the Indonesian government, because the Joint Statement seemed to limit the rights of the West Papuan people who represent WPNCL to become MSG members.

Various attempts by groups or groups of people in the form of separatist movements with the aim of separating themselves from the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia are national problems that must be resolved. For this reason, simultaneous and intensive settlement of separatism cases in Papua (Papua and West Papua) continues to be carried out with an emphasis on efforts to improve security and order conditions.

The political movement for an independent Papua has emerged since the disappointment of Papua's integration into Indonesia, which was also driven by the Dutch by provoking that the Papuan people were already independent. Domestic political movements (1961 to 1980s) were not as effective as those carried out abroad because the Indonesian military at that time was very strong and paid attention to every move they made. Based on John RG Djopari's research on the OSP Rebellion since 1989, there are five things that have become obstacles for the military to carry out operations in Papua, especially in dealing with OSP.

These things are: first, the OSP rebels can hide themselves among the many scattered tribal tribes; second, OSP controls a forested area that is difficult for TNI members to penetrate so they can hide and escape pursuit; third, OSP used local residents who were still primitive as shields, making military operations difficult; fourth, there are indications that the rebels received foreign assistance through Dutch missionaries and OSPs abroad. Fifth, OSP has a Papua Intelligent Service which is spread across various social strata. From the things above, it can be concluded that since the beginning of its formation, OSP has indeed mastered the field, and can take advantage of opportunities to achieve its goals by involving foreigners. Foreign involvement had indeed emerged before the 1969 Act, Papua was the last area left by the Dutch and the Dutch at that time were reluctant to leave Papua.

However, due to pressure from various parties and the application of the principle of *uti possidetis juris* or the state inherited its former colonies, including Papua which was part of the Dutch East Indies. So that the Dutch were forced to let go of Papua. Even though the Netherlands has surrendered its sovereignty to Indonesia, the Netherlands has not stopped supporting OSP. The ideology of an independent Papua itself is actually more dangerous than the Free Papua Movement. Ideology fueled the Papuan Separatist Movement either through organizations or individually.

This movement will emerge and develop through many fields, currently the political field is the main choice besides being armed. Chairman of the Presidium of Indonesia Police Watch (IPW), Neta S Pane, said on January 6 2014 that IPW recorded that from 2009 to early 2014 there were armed violence in Papua, which killed 41 people, both civilians and security forces. The state is considered unable to eradicate armed civilian groups in Papua and IPW has indicated that it has tolerated acts of violence in the Papua region. Even the shooting that killed eight members of the TNI at the Puncak Jaya Post on February 21 2013 has not been uncovered and the perpetrators have not been caught until now.

ICW feels that the government seems to have allowed this and it is as if the security forces in Papua are helpless. The ideology of Free Papua, which is intertwined with violence and anarchism, has actually hindered development in Papua. Of course, development and positive efforts that have been carried out by the Government so far can be disrupted.

Currently political groups continue to exist with the Free West Papua campaign since 2004 which has moved outside. As for overseas, this political group exists quite a bit with the establishment of an office in Oxford, the figure of Benny Wenda and the actions of the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) need to be watched out for because they actively maneuver to form international opinion to discredit the Government of Indonesia by rallying several parties from foreign countries such as England, Netherlands, Australia, Pacific Countries and America.

Several incidents at the UN general assembly were also colored by discussions of human rights violations committed by Indonesia in Papua which were also the result of ULMWP lobbying to several countries.

Since 2016 there have been 7 countries that have criticized Indonesia and in 2017 it was reduced to 5 countries until finally in 2020 only Vanuatu spoke about the Papuan issue. Indonesia has full authority to resolve the issue of Free Papua both through diplomacy and military channels, because the category of this movement from the perspective of Indonesian law is separatism. Even since the Chairman of the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) Benny Wenda, December 1, 2020, announced the formation of the interim West Papua government, the government actually already has the political legitimacy to show firmness regarding what strategic steps to take, because the ULMWP Chairman's statement has already fall into the category of explicit separatism. But the government's history of police and military action so far has been concerned with human rights violations in the eyes of the national and global NGO community, making the government's options for action very limited.

The threat of OPM/political separatist propaganda on social media is far more devastating and has made some West Papuan people, especially the younger generation, secretly and openly end up supporting Papuan separatist groups and seeing Indonesia as a colonizer which is the motivation for their struggle. The analysis results from the Emprit Drone owned by the State Intelligence Agency in 2019 show that many supporters of Free Papua actually come from outside Indonesia.

### **Government Policy On Dealing With Separatist Movements In Papua.**

Government policy in dealing with problems in Papua must be carried out through comprehensive and sustainable efforts by prioritizing the traditional culture of the Papuan people so that in the future Papua will be more advanced and equal to other provinces.

In addition, the state needs to increase combat and intelligence capabilities to deal with armed groups, on the other hand the Indonesian Government's diplomacy abroad and counter-narratives are needed to counter the efforts of the ULMWP which has discredited the Indonesian Government in the International World and to increase the ability of the territorial apparatus to win hearts and the minds of the OAP people so that a power of trust is created. This is important to do because so far there has been distrust of the central government from native Papuans and vice versa.

In taking this approach, especially for brothers and sisters who have opposite views/views, cooperation is needed through traditional leaders, religious leaders, community leaders, youth leaders, and women leaders to invite them back to unite and live properly as Indonesian citizens. The dynamics and problems of Papua have been responded to by the leadership of the President of Indonesia from the Old Order government to post-reform through various efforts and strategies.

Papua's problems are so complex that they require various approaches that have been taken by the government. The following table summarizes the various policies that have been made by the central government under the leadership of the president from time to time:



**Table 2 : Handling of the Papua Conflict From the Period of President Soekarno to President Joko Widodo**

| NO | PRESIDENT                         | POLICY   |
|----|-----------------------------------|--|
| 1. | Presiden Soekarno                 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reconquering Papua and integrating it into the Republic of Indonesia with diplomacy and resistance against the Dutch who still control Papua.</li> <li>Trikora</li> <li>KMB</li> <li>New York Agreement</li> </ul>  |
| 2. | Presiden Soeharto                 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Consolidating Papua to remain an integral part of the Republic of Indonesia with a militaristic authoritarian approach, establishing Papua's status as a military operations area (DOM)</li> <li>Papera 1969</li> </ul>   |
| 3. | Presiden BJ. Habibie              | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Carrying out the demands for reform and implementing a democratic system</li> <li>Allowing the Papuan people to freely voice their political rights</li> <li>Received 100 Papuan leaders at the State Palace</li> </ul>   |
| 4. | Presiden KH. Abdurrahman Wahid    | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Decided that Papua and Aceh be granted Special Autonomy (otsus).</li> <li>Allowing Papua to be used as a regional name and ethnic name from previously Irian Jaya.</li> <li>Allowing the Morning Star flag together with the red and white flag</li> <li>Giving 1 billion for holding a big celebration of the Second Papuan People's Congress in Jayapura.</li> </ul>  |
| 5. | Presiden Megawati Soekarno Putri  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The death of the great figure of the Papuan people Theys Hiyo Wluay (2011)</li> <li>Division of Papua Province into two Provinces, namely Papua and West Papua through Presidential Instruction No. 1 of 2003</li> </ul>  |
| 6. | Presiden Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Encouraging PP no. 54 of 2004 concerning the formation of the MRP.</li> <li>Issuing Ipres No. 5 of 2007 concerning the New Deal for Papua which includes the acceleration of development in the fields of education, health and the economy</li> <li>Presidential Decree No. 6 of 2011 concerning accelerating the development of the provinces of Papua and West Papua by establishing UP4B</li> <li>A policy package that affirms the empowerment of OAP entrepreneurs in managing government projects sourced from the APBN and APBD.</li> </ul> |
| 7. | Presiden Joko Widodo              | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Freeing Foreign Journalists to Enter Papua</li> <li>Solving human rights problems</li> <li>Unconditional release of all political prisoners/napols</li> <li>Infrastructure and economic development</li> <li>Holistic Approach</li> <li>Presidential Decree No. 20 years 2020</li> <li>Presidential Instruction No. 9 of 2020</li> </ul>  |

Source: Analysis Results of the Author, processed from various open sources

During the era of President Jokowi-JK, development in Papua was one of the priorities with a holistic approach. The development of Papua is a very important indicator for assessing the performance of President Jokowi-JK's government in realizing people's welfare. This is related to the Jokowi-JK Nawa Cita program which emphasizes development from the periphery (border). Therefore development in the Papua region is a determining factor for the government's success in all programs being implemented.

The following are Jokowi-JK's priority programs, including the national food storage program, building the Papua mama market and other infrastructure development programs. In addition, in his first term, President Jokowi issued Presidential Instruction of the Republic of Indonesia Number 9 of 2017 concerning the Acceleration of Welfare Development in Papua and West Papua Provinces. The Presidential Instruction aims to organize the Acceleration of Welfare Development in Papua and West Papua Provinces in the fields of health and education, local economic development, basic infrastructure, digital infrastructure, and connectivity in order to create peaceful and prosperous communities in Papua and West Papua Provinces.

Meanwhile, the implementation of accelerated welfare development in Papua and West Papua Provinces is carried out with the following strategy::

- a. Culture-based development approach, customary territories, and focus on Indigenous Papuans;
- b. The focus of implementing development programs in villages in frontier (border), remote and underdeveloped areas, especially in remote and mountainous areas that are difficult to reach;
- c. Application of a dialogue approach with all components of society, community organizations, and local government administration agencies;
- d. Assistance to local government apparatus and the community;
- e. Empowerment and active involvement of local communities in monitoring and improving the quality of public services;
- f. Empowering Indigenous Papuan entrepreneurs and local entrepreneurs domiciled in Papua and West Papua Provinces; and
- g. Increasing partnership cooperation with international development partners, the community, social organizations established by Indonesian citizens, the private sector, and other stakeholders..

In dealing with the Free Papua Organization, the government is also trying to change the separatist stigma by releasing a number of political prisoners, building houses and providing supplies for pro-Indonesian fighters. The Special Autonomy Fund that has been rolled out has also continued to be added in the hope of accelerating development so that it is hoped that separatist ideology will decrease.

### **The Role Of Intelligence In Papua**

Intelligence Operations imply speed (velox) and accuracy (exactus), so that in carrying out Intelligence Operations it must have clear measurements, whether it has been successful, has not been maximized or has not been successful. This is indeed not easy to do because intelligence as an institution or as a function is indeed designed to be secretive in style. Of course, this does not always have to be a standard because for the good of the institution and the community, Intelligence must lift its veil and make improvements. Of course, for the sake of improvement, only certain and very limited parties are involved.

Intelligence Operations are actually well prepared and in accordance with their objectives, namely obtaining information about the target or the enemy to prevent enemy intelligence from having a negative effect. The form of Intelligence Operations itself can be carried out independently (independently) or Intelligence Operations as part of other operations (joint operations). Some of the most difficult things to do are synchronization and coordination. These two words are indeed the most expensive to find in Indonesia, although in the context of government, this shows that interoperability is indeed difficult in assignments. Apart from this, the main obstacle in Intelligence Operations is the interest factor and the money factor. Interests

here are the interests of individuals and persons who often intersect with business and positions. Another thing that also hampered operations occurred due to the lack of human resource capacity of the intelligence apparatus in the field. Apart from this context, obstacles can also occur due to inadequate planning or unsupportive policies.

## CONCLUSION

After the reform, the Free Papua Movement organization underwent a metamorphosis by using a political approach and utilizing technology. Based on an analysis of the threats the Free Papua Movement in Papua is under high threat (paying attention to the results of surveys and studies). Intelligence must utilize technology to counter opinion and prepare various scenarios to confront each organization. Every organization has a different typology and approach. One of them is encouraging strong local leadership in Papua, local leadership that needs to be supported by the center is also important to have a nationalist spirit and is pro to the Republic of Indonesia.

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