

THE SOCIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE POLICE AND SOCIETY IN CONSTRUCTING RADICAL PHENOMENA

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Abstract

Radical action is not an easily defined social phenomenon, like terror (terrorism). The use of the term radical among the public and government often invites uproar and tension, because socio-politically the use of this term can be seen as an attempt by the ruler or a group of leaders to freeze the voice of the opposition. In common sense, radical is understood as a faith-based, intolerant social action that does not hesitate to use violence. However, this kind of radical understanding is not definitively enough for police authorities to carry out police action (control, security, and management). On the other hand, in society, radical phenomena experience a process of fighting definitions between mainstream groups and religious behavior among minorities. The police action taken by the police authorities is imperatively inseparable from the process of conflictual interaction that lives in this community. This research was conducted in three provincial areas, using survey methods and focus group discussions. The result of this study is that the construction of the definition of radical groups cannot be separated from the structure and culture that live in mainstream society. The definition of radical action is contextual, and in social processes it is gradative. This aspect of gradation is important for the police in relation to the choice of police action which refers to the purpose of maintaining security and order. Police action by the police relies on social realities defined by mainstream society, which is pragmatically a form of carrying out security control duties.

Keywords: Radical Phenomena; Social Definition; Policing.

BACKGROUND

Compared to terrorism, radicalism is a complicated terminology. Terrorism has been definitively completed, which is categorized as *an extraordinary crime*. Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 15 of 2003 concerning the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism mentions this terrorism as,

"acts that use violence or threats of violence that creates an atmosphere of widespread terror or fear, that can cause mass casualties, and/or cause damage or destruction to strategically vital objects, the environment, public facilities, or international facilities with ideological, political, or security disturbance motives".

The aspect of violence attached to terrorism makes this concept easy to understand, so it is also easy to draw data. For example, in the *2019 Global Terrorism Index Measuring the Impact of Terrorism*, Indonesia ranks 35th out of 138 countries, and the highest in Afghanistan.

In addition to being distinguished from terrorism and other types of conventional crimes, radicalism is a phenomenon that is difficult for law enforcement authorities. This diction of radicalism is accommodated in regulations, for example, Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 5 of 2018 concerning the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism Article 43a, but

this diction does not have an affirmation of definition (Arizki, 2012).

This normative aspect is inadequate to, to borrow from George Lucas, reify radical social phenomena so that the security forces are reluctant to carry out police action. On the other hand, among the public, this radical concept is often used with a political tendency: to be a *labeling* tool against opponents with different political choices. In a loose formulation, for example, Mudhofir (2015), radicalism is aligned with the violent phenomenon inherent in radical political Islamic agents. On the other hand, Bertram, (2026: 324) calls radicalism as an adjective that is propped up as a way or process towards terrorism, *Social media has aided terrorist organizations in radicalizing Jihadis through the methods of recruitment within both online radicalization and online self-radicals*.

The difficulty of constructing a definition of radicalism is not only a problem for public security controllers but also a daily discussion (polemic) in the mass media. It is not uncommon for discussions about radicalism in the public sphere to give birth to tendentious views of political commodities. This kind of issue is also a concern for Giddens (2009). In the introduction to his book, *Beyond the Extremes of Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics* (2009), Giddens begins with the question "What does it mean to be politically radical today".

The uproar about the construction of radical definitions that strengthened in the early range of 2022 is just a repeat of previous noises. Triggered by President Joko Widodo's message at the opening of the TNI-Polri Leadership Meeting in early 2022, it emphasized that the TNI-Polri and their family members did not invite radical preachers in the name of democracy. The president's message was responded to enthusiastically by the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT). The Director of Prevention of BNPT constructs the concept of radicalism in a number of characteristics. *First*, teaching anti-Pancasila and pro-Khilafah teachings; *second*, teaching takfiri understanding; *third*, instilling a legitimate anti-leader or government attitude; *fourth*, exclusive to the environment and social change; *fifth*, anti-cultural local wisdom.

Through several radical characteristics, the National Agency for Counterterrorism (BNPT) released several allegedly radical speakers. These characteristics are intended to help the community in providing vigilance (*warning*) to religious lectures in public spaces.

However, the definition of radicalism described through the characteristics of the BNPT version has not been able to resolve polemics that live in social processes in society. In fact, the atmosphere becomes rowdy when in the social process the use of this radical concept is interpreted as an instrument of *labelling* against government opposition. Basically, these characteristics of radicalism have no regulative or constitutive power that can be used practically operationally by the police. The Indonesian Ulema Council views defining these characteristics as *a blunder*. The Indonesian Ulema Council affirmed,

*"Regarding the khilafiah and jihad Ijtima' (2021) MUI provides recommendations to the public and government so that understanding Jihad and khilafah is not viewed negatively, because Ijtima' Ulama Fatwa Commission of the VII MUI, MUI emphasizes the values of sincerity (jihad) and leadership (khilafah) are Islamic teachings to overcome the problems of the ummah and nation"*¹

Not stopping the determination from the MUI, BNPT's initiative in building the characteristics of radicalism also received a 'warning' from the DPR. The Deputy Chairman of Commission III of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia asked BNPT not to make polemics about this radicalism.

The official BNPT website said that the direction of counterterrorism policy in 2022 was implemented with the *Penta helix* concept. This term refers to efforts to achieve institutional goals by prioritizing multistakeholder cooperation or collaboration involving elements of government, academics, business entities or actors, society, communities, media to art actors. For the police, this kind of thinking is nothing new. Scolnick (1999) and Monica (without years) assert that the maintenance of security and order is more substantial on the pre-emptive and preventive side, not only on law enforcement or repressive functions. The principle of modern policing in the maintenance of security and order is oriented towards its synergy with the public. Meanwhile, in the aspect of law enforcement minimizing community involvement, this point is a democratic norm.

Public involvement in the maintenance of security and order becomes vital because the subject of the 'sense of security' is the community so as to provide space for the subject in defining social reality including radicalism. This method was adopted from modern policing. Thus, controlling radicalism with various definitional constructions that live in society is almost impossible without involving the community.

(Research issues to be discussed/discussed research objectives by showing relevance and discipline)

This study aims to explore the relationship between the police and the community in constructing the definition of radical groups. Police action against radical groups cannot be fully based on positive legal norms because radical diction does not have a coherent definition as in the phenomenon of terrorism and crime in general. Here, in the social process radicalism is a complicated social phenomenon, as Jensen (2019) said, the *concept of radicalization was problematic and a source of confusion*. On this side, the process of legitimacy of defining radical groups by the police as the controlling authority of public security is obtained through its relationship with the community. The process of defining this radical phenomenon carried out together is substantively a form of implementation of Presidential Decree Number 29/2014 concerning the Performance Accountability System of Government Agencies.

The way in which the police maintain security and order related to radical phenomena cannot be separated from the socially constructed process of definition. This framework for understanding the social actions of police actors refers to Giddens (2010; vii), that social action must be understood as a rational form of action: social action must be rational.

Borrowing Giddens' (1993; xi) thoughts on the duality of structure, actors' actions are framed by structure. Here, in this study, it is assumed that the 'way of defining' is action, so the definition of radical action basically does not have a firm structural reference, as in terror terminology. Thus, tracing the way radical action is defined through police-community relations is a process of structuration itself in the duality of structure and action.

METHOD

(Method used). This research was conducted in three provinces in Indonesia: West Kalimantan, Southeast Sulawesi, and Bangka Belitung. These three provinces are not intended as a representation of the "face" of Indonesian society. The method of collecting data using *focus group discussion* (FGD) and surveys. Through limited discussion, direct contestation of views (cross-opinions) is obtained. Giddens (1999;5) calls it an "act of *ideation*" between police and society, making capturing aspects of instrumental rationality possible.

Limited discussion participants include, *first*, community leaders at the district and provincial levels; and, *second*, among police officers consisting of operational managers. At the police level are the heads of Binmas, Intelligence, and Investigation units; at the Polda level are the Director of Binmas, the Director of Intelligence, and the Director of Investigation.

Meanwhile, surveys are used to capture phenomena that are 'surface', opinions, or views. Questionnaires are distributed through *Google Forms* randomly to members of the police and the public.

Data processing is carried out as a kind of *selective discourse*. A number of points narrated as research findings are *stressing that was found repeatedly throughout limited discussions in a number of districts and provinces. Thus, the choice of points or findings has a standard as "has become a public issue". To borrow Buzan's (1998) terminology, it is a way of understanding the process of securitization.* Meanwhile, survey data is processed using cross tables to get comparisons between police respondents and the community. Quantitative data (crosstab) obtained through this survey is also used as part of the topics discussed in focus group discussions to get controlled 'interpretation'.

There are at least three modes of research on radical (action). *First*, the inductive-emic model was carried out by Kundnani (2012) and Hussein Tahiri (2013). Kundnani does not define radical concepts but explores these concepts that live and are used among certain communities. So did Tahiri, tracing how society identifies radicalism and extremism. An act categorized as radical, for Tahiri insofar as it moves beyond accepted social norms.

Second, the normative-regulative pattern is commonly carried out in legal research. For example, Arizki (2018), interpreted the term "radical" in Article 43B paragraph (4) of Law 5/2018 to determine the suitability of the term radical with the concept of the Indonesian legal state;

Third, the deductive-ethical complexion. This deductive-ethical research model dominates the most. In the deductive-ethical style, researchers build their own radical definitions, of course through the contestation of literature, and then this definition is used to understand the reality that lives in society.

In this pattern, for example, Ismail (2012); Fealy (2005); and Arifin (2012). The authoritative reference in this directive-ethical method is Oliver Roy (1994). Roy elaborated radical limits using diction equivalent to "too Islamic", a term that later paralleled notions of Islamism, fundamentalism, and revivalism.

Fealy (2005) constructs a radical definition as Roy did by adding indications to aspects of legitimacy in minority-majority relations and dramatic actions. He wrote,

“Radical Islam seeks dramatic change in society and the state by the unstinting implementation of shari’a (Islamic law) and the upholding of Islamic principles. Radical Muslims tend to have a strictly literal interpretation of the Qur’an”.

A number of characteristics of radicalism that Fealy traced such as obsession with the enforcement of Islamic law, spirituality in interpreting the Qur'an, and ideas about dramatic social action are not automatically categorized as radical if they are not associated with the aspect of legitimacy from the majority. The legitimacy aspect becomes very significant, a side that is also suspected by Hussein Tahiri (2013).

The context of legitimacy for these intolerant groups concerns the political system of a state or nation. And, this is an ethical question in democracy: whether a democracy that carries the spirit of tolerance can accept intolerant groups.

Another study, Husani (2012), sees radicalism as an instrument in political movements. Radicalism is present in response to injustice as innate to the political system. He called it a "transformation from radical Islam to jihadist/terrorist Islam". This explanation is framed in variations of Islamic movements. First, from the national movement to the practical political movement; second, from political movements to da'wah movements; and third, the transformation from radical to terrorist. These three categories are actually problematic because it seems as if these three movements run linearly according to the timeline.

In fact, it (these three types of movements) is an entity that is present at a period of time. It would be helpful to explain the category of radical action if Husaini had not assumed the reality of the Islamic movement to be linear in time.

In fact, at one stage there were three types (modes) of Islamic movements. The consistency of analysis at one particular time stage that presents three types of Islamic gears will help analytically and compare in building a definition of each movement group.

Of the three research patterns, this study is closer to Kundnani, which uses inductive-emic. Kundnani (2012) sees radical reality as a social phenomenon produced through social contestation. He traced radicalism in terms of the defining process constructed by experts, researchers, and scholars. Consequently, this radical conceptualization of Kundnani's findings narrowed because it was framed in industrial and development interests.

This research fills a gap that Kundnani does not see, namely: how the definition of radical (radical action) is socially constructed in the undercurrents of society, the police, and the elite of the local community of the district. This study aims to get an idea of how radical (actions) are defined through social processes built through police-community relations

DISCUSSION

Radical Articulation

The concept of Radical in limited discussion among public figures, although variously understood, is not in principle placed in a linear relationship with terror. Terror is understood as in law is an act that tends to 'attack' physically. Not every radical group commits terror, but every act of terror begins with radicalism. In this kind of framework, radicalism is understood as a social action of a gradative nature. Radical at the lowest scale is an act of intolerance and conflictual action with mainstream circles, at the highest level scale this is an act of terrorism or physical violence. On the other hand, mainstream religious behavior is difficult to resist as an indicator in building the definition of radical action. Psychological suppression such as intimidation, raids, and acts of discrimination against minorities are often not categorized as radical acts.

Ideas about Social Systems: Radicalism in limited discussion among community leaders is addressed to social groups that have ideas about social systems or orientations about the 'ideal type of society' that are different from mainstream *circles*. Basically, this kind of idea is not difficult to find in the form of writing spread among the wider community. For example, Marxian ideas or ideal types are easily found in bookstores and on the internet. Similarly, it is not difficult to obtain literature on Islamic political orientation that contains ideas such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hizb ut-Tahrir as well as religious thoughts such as Mu'tazilite theology, Shi'a, and the construction (*ushl*) of *scripturalist fiqh* (a kind of Wahhabi). The idea of the ideal type of society borrows Hafez (2018) referring to the term *political doctrine*. *This political doctrine* is an instrument to obtain justification or justify actions and motivations in the movement. Hafez (2018;2) writes, "*Radical Islam refers to Muslim individuals, groups, organizations, and parties that see in Islam a guiding political doctrine that justifies and motivates mobilization on behalf of that doctrine*".

Realized by many in limited discussion, the presence of references to alternative types of ideal social systems is a normal condition in democracies. The alternative discourse of this ideal type of social system initially only settled in academic study centers at universities, then experienced dissemination in conjunction with democratization. For example, Bruinessen (2002), in the post-Suharto period these alternative ideas increasingly dared to show themselves. When alternative ideas of this ideal type of social system are articulated in the public sphere, it causes shocks to the order of society. This is where the alternative ideal type of social system has become a movement. The tension in society is simply the rejection of (alternative) new thinking. Society rejects something different.

Thus, basically, the tension among society towards minorities is about articulating its ideological ideas in the public sphere that disturb public order. The phenomenon of 'disturbing public order' in the aspect of praxis is contextual, following the structure and culture of society.

Social Action: Radical is a social act, that is, an action deliberately aimed at the public. Thus, no matter how much one has thoughts about alternative socio-political systems, if (only) articulated in a limited particular community, it is not categorized as radical. Radicalism in this

framework requires contact with the institutionalization dimension so that ideas such as Marxism-Leninism and the Caliphate system are normal phenomena conveyed and discussed in the academic community. In this context, discussing alternative socio-political systems is still categorized as 'thought'; not a social action categorized as radical. At a minimum level, an action is called radical insofar as it has an indication of action in the form of conveying the idea of an alternative socio-political system in the public sphere.

The term alternative socio-political system idea refers to a "paradigmatic" sense: about how socio-political systems are organized and managed using alternative ideological references. It is through this framework that public figures in limited discussions give radical labels to mass organizations, although in their social movements do not commit physical violence, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir. In Fealy's (2005) articulation, Hizb ut-Tahrir's radicalism does not gain community legitimacy not because it has a tendency to carry out *violence*, but the content of an intolerant ideology. From a police perspective, it is understood that mass organizations such as Hizb ut-Tahrir are not seen as a potential category of criminogenic correlative factors, in contrast to police responses to mass organizations such as the Islamic Defenders Front.

This way of articulating ideas in the public sphere that contains gradations of action is referred to as radical. An action is called radical insofar as it disturbs the public's sense of security. Borrowing Buzan's (1998) construct, the articulation of thinking about the ideal alternative to this social system at its earliest stage is a public issue, then increases to an issue that is seen as significant for security institutions to respond to. At this stage, Buzan calls it a *securitization of the issue*.

A stronger category of radical action is articulating the idea of a social system in the public sphere by berating the government, as illustrated in the table below. The question asked,

"Below are the characteristics of group symptoms that are easy to cause friction among the community. Which are the most symptomatic characteristics in the district where you live".

Here are the views of members of the police and the public,

Table 1: Professions' Radical Symptoms in District Environment Cross tabulation

			Radical Symptoms in the District Environment							Total
			sermons containing insults with political tendencies	the group that is easy to convert to heresy	imposing the idea	Exclusion/ separating oneself	violence	Etc	7.00	
profession	Police	Count	238	110	100	125	148	78	1	800
		% within Profess	29.8%	13.8%	12.5%	15.6%	18.5%	9.8%	0.1%	100.0%
	Non-Police/ Community	Count	176	205	114	81	79	35	0	690
		%within Profess	25.5%	29.7%	16.5%	11.7%	11.4%	5.1%	0.0%	100.0%
Total	Count		414	315	214	206	227	113	1	1490
		% within profess	27.9%	21.1%	14.4%	13.8%	15.2%	7.6%	0.1%	100.0%

Table 2

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	78.895 ^a	6	.000
Likelihood Ratio	80.159	6	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	21.496	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	1490		

a. 2 cells (14.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .46.

Although the Chi-Square table shows the relationship between the views of police respondents and community respondents, the P-value is 0.000 peers, but in detail, the components of the views of two types of respondents put the aspect of 'lectures containing insults with political tendencies' is the dominant aspect.

Thus, the social action that articulates radicalism, both among the police and the public, lies in lectures containing insults that have a political tendency of 27 percent. The second radical articulation is the existence of 'heretical groups'.

Of course, this number must be read contextually. That the conditions that are living in society, especially a social phenomenon that is seen as disturbing order and inciting conflict, are 'lectures containing politically inclined insults' and actions that easily 'give the label of infidel or heresy'. Society's rejection of these two types of actions shows that they transcend social norms. "*Beyond accepted social or community norms*" (Hussein: 2013;30).

The findings of this survey parallel the findings in the limited discussion (FGD). Community leaders in all regions were uncomfortable confronting political narratives in houses of worship and narratives that were prone to heresy.

Although basically, this kind of narrative is not a new phenomenon, in the view of local community leaders and academics this narrative has gained momentum in the last ten to twenty years.

Mainly, the interaction of young people with the world of education. In fact, it does not come from religious education such as IAIN or institutions that specifically have a religious curriculum (Islam).

Social Institutions and Radicalism: A number of social institutions living in society are important to track, where the most dominant socialization agents shape radical ways of thinking. The assumption is that humans are born as tabula rasa (blank paper), they become radical or moderate as seen from the institution that transmits these thoughts. Here a limited search of the institutions responsible for the presence of radical thinking.

The question asked is, *the strongest potential presence of radicalism in your immediate environment is in:*

Table 3: Professions' Source of the idea of Cross tabulation radicalism

			The source of the idea of radicalism						
			a study group based on religion	Social media	Peer group or close friends	Islamic boarding school	School/ University	Mass Media	Total
profession	Police	Count	227	277	143	72	48	34	800
		% within profess	28.4%	34.6%	17.9%	8.9%	6.0%	4.3%	100.0%
	% of total		15.2%	19.6%	9.6%	4.8%	3.2%	2.3%	53.7%
	Non-Police/ Community	Count	163	225	151	67	47	37	690
%within profess		23.6%	32.6%	21.9%	9.7%	6.8%	5.4%	100.0%	
% of total		10.9%	15.1%	10.1%	4.5%	3.2%	2.5%	46.3%	
Total	Count		390	502	294	139	95	71	1490
	% within profess		26.2%	33.7%	19.7%	9.3%	6.4%	4.8%	100.0%
	% of total		26.2%	33.7%	19.7%	9.3%	6.4%	4.8%	100.0%

Table 4

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	8.284 ^a	5	.141
Likelihood Ratio	8.289	5	.141
Linear-by-Linear Association	5.802	1	.016
N of Valid Cases	1490		

a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 32.88.

Of the six social institutions above, social media is the most dominant means of spreading radical thoughts by 33.7 percent; followed by the study group, 26.2 percent, and the closest friends or peers group, 19.7 percent. The Chi-Square table shows a p-value greater than 0.05, meaning that there is no relationship between the views of the police profession and the public's guidance on the source of radicalism ideas.

Thus, the dominance of social media shows that the process of spreading radical thought is not sufficiently traced through social aggregation through narrow physical interactions such as *peer groups* and study groups. It imperatively indicates that the social realities of living in remote districts are connected to the broader social aggregate. Efforts to stem the spread of radical thought are thus no longer effectively eliminated within the boundaries of the administrative area. The power of social media compared to a face-to-face environment can be understood in terms of phenomenology. In this era of digital technology, basically, no time gap is wasted because the power of social media is to unite information with affective taste tendencies. So that the existence of loose time (*leisure*) is actually replaced to explore social media, this is precisely the effective moment of spreading ideas. Social media is the most effective interaction instrument regarding *real-time* and breadth of reach, allowing for maximum exchange of ideas.

On this side, social media is the most effective socialization institution in spreading radical thoughts and ideologies. Close friends or *peer groups* as agents of socialization of radical thoughts are far below social media. A number of figures and scholars view that social friends in the environment become sublime because the term 'close friends' shifts from conventional land to cyberspace or social media groups. In this context, it is important to mention the network with what lives in Java, such as the thinking of FPI and Hizb ut-Tahrir.

This kind of phenomenon is realized by the police. In limited discussions with members of the police, the senior manager (Unit Chief) confirmed that the presence of radicals is gaining space in this democratic era. So, defining radical actions is not easy because it is often intertwined behind the spirit of democracy. In such a framework it reinforces that the definition of radical action cannot be placed singly, but is gradative.

Interpretation of Scripture: Radical behavior, however a product of socialization described above, religious leaders realize that the way of interpreting the holy book of the Qur'an contributes. It is in this second factor (about the interpretation of scripture) that it becomes a long discussion, namely in asking: whether the scriptures themselves provide opportunities for radicalism. Nahdliatul Ulama-based community leaders (NU) view the Qur'an as not tolerating radicalism, meaning that radical actions are entirely a mistake in interpreting the holy book.

Indeed, the holy book contains a number of verses of war and murder, but it must be seen in context. This contextual reading has three contested factors: *First*, the scientific dimension of interpretation itself; *Second*, the dimension of reading *maqashid as sharia*, the substantive meaning of sharia. Often the "harsh" proselytizing of insults against the government and the heresy of mainstream religious behavior refers to (legitimacy) also carried out by the companions of the prophet; and, *third*, a reading of today's social conditions.

The reading of these three factors is well established as a framework of thought among NU. The relationship between religion and the state in the social-political system has been completed in its format for NU. For example, the concept of religious moderation in public (and even state) relations such as *tasamuh and tawasuth* is more familiar and systematized in the thinking system among NU than in other groups. Such a system of thought becomes an instrument of theological legitimacy in detecting radical factors. Meanwhile, on the police side, the controlling authority of public security has a distance of cognition from the theological narrative as familiar among NU. In such a framework, basically, the police do not have the instruments to track radical factors. Of course, the police are institutionally not equipped with theological skills to detect the heresy of religion to define radical aspects.

This section became a long discussion in the FGD. The point refers to the topic of the relationship of the state with religion, that is, the extent to which the state intervenes in religion, or vice versa. Basically, it is realized that the existence of state institutions is not to protect one particular interpretation or a certain theological framework. This view refers to the fact that Indonesia is not a religious state, however, in the social process the protection of certain interpretations is impossible to avoid because in the end, the police choose to protect the interpretation of *mainstream groups*.

The police cannot be separated from the framework of the community whose main duties refer to Law number 2/2002 concerning the National Police of the Republic of Indonesia, namely maintaining public security and order, enforcing the law, providing protection and protection, and service to the community. Police action against religious conflicts in order to establish security and order is essentially a protection of mainstream religious interpretation. These police actions include coercion, surveillance, granting permits, and a kind of neglect of mass actions.

POLICE–COMMUNITY RELATIONS

The police's abandonment of the majority rejecting preachers (*da'i*) who are identified as wahabi is a partiality of the police over the majority, as well as a pragmatic and efficient step for the police in maintaining order and security. The same pattern in a number of districts also occurs in relations between religious communities. Whether the police realize it or not, the protection of religious interpretation in *mainstream* circles automatically parallels the interests of public security and order, although it has the consequence of compromising the religious rights of minorities.

Thus, the police in carrying out their duties in maintaining security and order, especially in the aspects of religious order and belief rely more on the definition constructed by the *mainstream* about radical acts. The term 'mainstream' is thus automatically categorized as a moderate group itself.

The construction of the definition of radical (group) is contextual following the structure of thinking among the majority or religious interpretation among the majority. In this kind of framework, Tahiri (2013) refers to it as, *a process of moving beyond accepted social or community norms*. It is strongly felt among the community about the tendency to increasingly urbanize in the way of religion because mainstream religious circles are polarized or divided. So that mainstream religious interpretation is no longer a single entity as in villages (hinterland).

Consequently, the term radical is defined as narrower. Here, radicals cannot be identified solely through differences in religious ways, but rather by articulating what is considered right. Articulating the idea of what is considered right through means of contextually violating living norms, such as insults, heresy and politicization of places of worship is an important factor in defining radical (groups).

This kind of phenomenon strengthens Buzan (2012), the religious articulation of heterogenic urban communities does not immediately touch public security reactions, and does not become a public issue. This differs in homogeneous or rural areas.

Elements in Definition Construction: An aspect of looking at police-community relations is to question how strongly communities engage the police when they find radical symptoms in their immediate neighborhoods. Police involvement by the community in social symptoms to trace what phenomenon Buzan (1998) calls *securitization*. Thus social reality is defined together.

This point is important to reflect two realities, first, regarding public trust in police institutions in handling radical groups; second, it parallels the power of police-community synergy in controlling security in general. Within the framework of the modern policing model as proposed by Robert Peels, a community initiative in sharing problems with the police is indicative of the success of security institutions. To explore the strength of this police-community synergy questions were asked to respondents:

"In your neighborhood, does the community involve the police against the symptoms of radicalism?"

Table 5: Professions' People's Reaction When They Encounter Symptoms of Radical Cross tabulation

			The source of the idea of radicalism				
			invite police officers to find a solution	doesn't involve the police	Passive	etc	Total
profession	Police	Count	365	255	99	91	800
		% within profess	45.6%	31.9%	12.4%	10.1%	100.0%
		% within People's Reaction When They Find Radical Symptoms	53.7%	52.3%	51.6%	63.3%	53.8%
		% of total	24.5%	17.1%	6.7%	9.4%	53.8%
	Non-Police/ Community	Count	315	233	93	47	688
%within profess		45.8%	33.9%	13.5%	6.9%	100.0%	
		% within People's Reaction When They Find Radical Symptoms	46.3%	47.7%	48.4%	36.7%	46.2%
		% of total	21.2%	15.7%	6.3%	3.2%	46.2%
Total		Count	690	488	192	129	1488
		% within profess	45.7%	32.8%	12.9%	8.6%	100.0%
		% within People's Reaction When They Find Radical Symptoms	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of total	26.2%	33.7%	19.7%	9.3%	100.0%

The action taken by the community when finding symptoms of radical existence, according to respondents both among the police and respondents among the community is to invite police members to find solutions, amounting to 45.7 percent. However, respondents who 'did not involve the police' were also quite large, 32.8 percent.

In limited discussions, the reluctance of the public to involve the police reinforced the proposition that radicalism is gradation: a type of radicalism from soft to hard. The mildest type of radical is the conflictual group. This conflictual term refers to a way of articulating the idea of difference to the majority, straightforwardly conveying the idea of difference, especially accompanied by satire and insults. This site confirms that actually, religious differences do not matter if they only 'settle' as a personal practice. This type of group, for example, is in the case of Ahmadiyya.

The process of defining radical nota bene emphasizes the conflictual dimension which refers to indications of ideological, theological, and verbal behavioral differences. Groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir on the behavioral / action side are not a radical category but are seen as a danger on the ideological side. Like Ahmadis and Shias, they are not categorized as radical, other than for theological differences. This difference is therefore seen as disturbing the mainstream "comfort", even though this group does not carry out any activity let alone berate the

government or attack fiqh among the majority. Unlike the Wahhabi-Salafi group, often tensions among people stem from articulating differences. The actions of the *mainstream* against the Ahmadiyya and Shia minority, of course, do not make the majority (mainstream) group a radical group.

The existence of these conflictual groups in Hussein's (2013) reading as groups that often act beyond social norms -- beyond accepted social or community norms. On the scale of regulative structures that restrict social measures, violations of social norms do not automatically attract the attention of security authorities. Within the framework of Buzan (2012), the behavior of this conflictual group has not become a real issue inviting the involvement of community authorities and public security controllers (police): *securitization of issue*. That is, this conflictual phenomenon has not shifted into a 'security issue'. This kind of condition is implicitly understood among the community and the police. On the police side, tensions between these groups do not always automatically have legal implications. Simplistically, this condition shifts into *a securitization of issue* when there are several reports (LP) in the police.

The term radical group on a low scale is actually just a substitute for the term conflictual group. The presence of radical groups on this scale in suburban, district, and urban areas is a common symptom of the past two decades. A provincial scholar Rector of IAIN Bangka in a limited discussion represented thoughts that lived in other provinces in this study, namely West Kalimantan and Southeast Sulawesi. He suggests that the presence of these conflictual groups has emerged significantly in the last twenty years. Its existence is inversely proportional to the shrinking vitality of local wisdom (*adat*) in social life. Agregatively, young people have a religious spirit coupled with sensitivity to their religion. They are millennials who are familiar with digital information technology. Together with a high sensitivity to religion, it is flammable: short wick. To the symptoms of religious harassment, they are very reactive. Quoting the Rector of IAIN Bangka and the Chairman of MUI,

"In the past, if there was harassment of Islam it didn't really matter; today the reaction is easily overreacted. What feels radical is when this reaction is mixed with politics ".

Against this condition – the decline in the vitality of local wisdom – an indigenous leader in Kendari, Southeast Sulawesi, stated, *"It feels like there is a new version of Islamic teachings"*. These groups are conflictual, not reluctant to attack as heresy against Tolaki customs, Southeast Sulawesi.

Parallel to the average in the West Kalimantan region. A Tanjungpura University lecturer diagnosed the existence of conflictual groups living in his area, calling them *'certain groups that clash customs with religion'*. In a limited discussion, he explained that the tension between religious groups and customs does not always have actors designing conflict scenarios. This tension is merely mechanical as a consequence of religious movements that inherit the purifiative face of Islam. This kind of explanation seems to be the same, although it is not exactly the same as Ali Jum'ah (2014). According to Ali Jumah, former Mufti of Egypt, one of

the factors of radicalism is conspiratorial thinking. Thus, radicalism can be present among the majority, then through this proposition, it is also relevant to read physical violence that occurs or is committed by the majority group against the minority. This proposition refers to phenomena, such as the persecution of minority groups such as the prohibition of the establishment of houses of worship.

There are at least three social conditions that simultaneously reinforce the presence of this conflictual group. *First*, the strengthening of urban mobility to sub-urban areas; *second*, the development of telecommunications technology, especially social media; and, *third*, the strengthening of religious fervor among young people. This religious spirit among young people automatically strengthens religious sensitivity. They are over-reactive and over-simplistic to religious phenomena and easily draw conclusions as symptoms of religious abuse. So they are flammable: short wicks. This kind of context by Oliver Roy (1994) is referred to as "too Islamic" or Islamism. Rector of IAIN Bangka and Chairman of MUI said,

"...In the past, if there was harassment of Islam it didn't really matter, today the reaction feels easy to overreact. What feels radical is when this reaction is mixed with politics."

The momentum of the past two decades is important to analyze the emergence of radical groups as described by the Bangka scholar, parallel to Syamsul Ma'arif's analysis in the *Kompas Daily*, 14/7/2023. Syamsul Ma'arif confirmed Abdul Aziz's research on the threat of counterculture pesantren that also occurred in the last twenty years. The emergence of counterculture pesantren is contrary to mainstream pesantren.

Security Systems: Coordinative Imperative: A considerable number of people chose not to involve the police when they found radical symptoms (Table 5). This reluctance is because they view police involvement in a formalistic sense. Formalistic means involving the police through a bureaucratic process by making a systematically planned Police Report, and may have legal and social implications for the complainant. Simplistically, it can be said that people avoid dealing with law enforcement officials. This explanation was obtained through limited discussions with community leaders at the district level.

In addition, the community believes that the police have carried out early detection of the existence of radical symptoms living in their environment because basically radical symptoms are not social phenomena that are spontaneously present. The public trusts the police through members of the Bhabinkamtibmas and intelligence is certain to explore this kind of phenomenon. So, basically imperatively society cannot ignore the function of the police in the social process, that the police is part of the 'objective' social reality in relation to security and order.

Another factor that causes people to be reluctant to involve the police over radical symptoms is the gradative nature of radicals. For example, conflictual preachers (berating the government, heresy the practices of the majority) are seen as radical symptomatic phenomena, but on this scale, there is still no need to involve the police. This type of radical symptom lives abundantly and freely in the community. On this side, the fundamental difference with the New Order era.

So, response data that are reluctant to involve the police in radical symptoms, then this quantitative data is confirmed through limited discussion. As a result, respondents' reluctance was caused because the radical symptoms in question were still on a harmless scale. At this point, researchers realize that the questions asked in the questionnaire contain time that interferes with internal validity. However, at the same time, such findings explain that radicalism is a problematic reality in social processes, as Giddens (2009) suggests.

Radical symptoms on the lowest scale, a kind of conflictual preacher, are seen as still "normal" phenomena in social life. However, this kind of "normality" is realized by local elites in the sense of a condition of tension as a sociological implication of the changing process of societal dynamics.

CONCLUSION

The structure and culture of the people in these three provinces (Bangka, West Kalimantan, and Southeast Sulawesi) are moderate Islamic regions, with no history as areas that give birth to radicalism. Groups identified by mainstream circles as radicals have been an influence from outside the region for the past two decades. The existence of these radical groups coincides with the strengthening of social mobility and democratization. The construction of the process of defining radical groups is contextual, following the structure and culture that lives among the majority or *mainstream*. But the constant definition in these three provincial regions is that radicalism and radical behavior are gradative. And, another characteristic that is constant is that radical groups carry an alternative narrative of the ideal type of socio-political system based on religious interpretation. Carrying an alternative socio-political system is understood as a correction to the ideology of Pancasila which has been considered final. The group that carries an alternative socio-political system is placed as a high gradation of radicalism. The lowest gradation of radicalism is faith-based social action by building conflictual narratives, the highest gradation is terror (physical) attacks.

On the other hand, splinter theological groups, such as tariqa groups that are suspected of having *aqidah* deviating from the majority, are not categorized as radical groups. In this context, radicalism is not related to aspects of *aqidah*, but to actions defined by the majority group as disturbing order because they attack the way of the majority religion. These tariqa groups are not like (wahhabi) groups that verbally 'attack' religious ways in mainstream circles. On the contrary, in the perspective of religious freedom, it is this kind of religious group that experiences persecution among the community.

The conflictual narrative they carry in this public space means that they do not hesitate to intersect and clash with the understanding of mainstream circles. His narrative in this public space, both in lectures and on social media, attacks the religious way of the majority who still hold strong traditions and customs. This group is suspected a group affiliated to the Wahabi interpretation. In addition to attacking the religious way of the *mainstream* as an indication of radical actions, in some areas, political narratives are included. That is a narrative that carries hatred for the legitimate government. This political nuance is a legacy that occurred in Jakarta in the 2017 gubernatorial election.

Police action by the police against radical groups -- which includes coercion, surveillance, granting permits, and surveillance -- refers to the definition of radicalism built by mainstream groups. This protection of religious interpretation in *mainstream* circles automatically parallels the interests of public security and order, although it has the consequence of compromising the religious rights of minorities. Thus, the security praxis carried out by the police reinforces the definition of 'radical action' built by the *mainstream* itself. For the police, the easiest factor to identify as a radical group is a narrative that carries an alternative socio-political system.

The process of police relations with mainstream society in building the definition of radical groups is imperative, because police actions solely refer to the normative framework of their main duties which refer to Law number 2/2002 concerning the National Police of the Republic of Indonesia. Police-community relations respond to radicalism in general through its control of lectures identified as radical. Police knowledge of such radical groups was gained through its contestation with moderates. On this side, basically, radical groups or radicalism are defined sociologically.

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